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NEAR MISS REPORTING: PERSPECTIVES ON WORKER CONVERSANCE OF
INCIDENT EVENTS ACROSS TWO INDUSTRIES
Abstract
By Julia R. McGee
University of the Pacific
2019
The practice of reporting workplace incident events is adopted as best practice by
organizations and complies with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
mandates. Reporting the near miss incident type in which no injury or damage to equipment or
the environment occurs is buttressed by the assumption that both the worker and the organization
ascribe to the same goal to identify workplace hazards and prevent incident recurrence. The goal
of incident reporting is not apparent, and the path to achieving the goal is obstructed by internal
and external hazards that act to oppose the reporting process, such that the goals are obscured by
competing priorities. The general qualitative method was applied to a nonrandom snowball
sampling technique to recruit eight participants. Over 176 years of combined experience across
aircraft maintenance and petrochemical operations are represented. Participants were removed
from either industry within the last five years. Each participant experienced multiple near miss
incident events in the past. At the time an incident occurs, the compelling individual need that
exists is explained in terms of Abraham Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation. The ProcessPractice-Purpose principle is developed and used to demonstrate the association between
activities (the “what”) that occur within workspaces and customary practices (the “how”) that
develop in the course of realizing the incident reporting goal. Three recurring themes support the
findings: (a) The motivation to report, (b) Beliefs about reporting, and (c) The purpose of
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reporting over time. Together, the themes form the three-legged stool of the incident reporting
perception. Any leg missing renders the stool out of balance. Hazards are identified in terms of
personal safety. The near miss definition is expressed in terms of individual perspective and is
guided by experience, personality, knowledge, and personal agency to take action. The goal of
reporting is explained in terms of benefit to people, the process, and practice. Alignment with
the OHSA goal is evaluated by examining the motivation to report, beliefs about reporting, and
the purpose of reporting over time. The Principle of Understanding partnership model is
developed to engage the worker and the organization in active learning from near miss incidents
through awareness and knowledge about the cumulative utility of near miss data, perceptions of
incident severity, and optimizing communication.

Keywords: latent hazards, near miss, HaSE, priority of motives, cumulative utility
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Across industry sectors, from agricultural operations to petroleum refining, the utility of
reporting incidents is recognized and applied in efforts to detect and eliminate workplace hazards
that reduce the risk potential for injury, illness, and equipment damage (National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health [NIOSH], 2015b; U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b). Despite
the perceived value in reporting, near miss events continue to remain underreported (Jones,
Kirchsteiger, & Bjerke, 1999; Miller, 2008; Reason, 1998).
An incident is defined as “a work related event in which an injury or ill‐health (regardless
of severity) or fatality occurred, or could have occurred” (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a, p.
2). A near miss is “an incident that could have caused serious injury or illness but did not; also
called ‘near miss’” (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a, p. 2). Incident statistics that are
mandatorily required are promoted by corporations and publicly emphasized. The statistics
represent how safety programs are managed. Near miss statistics data are more abundant and
accessible than other incident data (Barach & Small, 2000). The Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) is required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of 1970 (OSHA) to
collect accurate statistics about reported injuries, illnesses, and fatalities that occur in the
workplace. BLS data determine that the occurrence of underreporting is problematic and chronic
(Miller, 2008). If lessons are to be applied from incident reporting opportunities, workers must
be able to connect to the goal of reporting. And more clarity in the definition and purpose of
near miss reporting is needed.
Since the enactment of OSHA law in 1970, workplace injuries and fatalities have been
reduced by more than 65% through the cooperative efforts of OSHA administrators, workers,
and employers (U.S. Department of Labor, 2018). Despite the benefits to reporting near miss
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events, some employers fail to report severe workplace injuries and face the probability of
monetary fines and more frequent inspections from OSHA (Michaels, 2016).
Aircraft maintenance and repair and petrochemical operations are classified as different
industry sector types: Transportation and Warehousing and Manufacturing (U.S. Census Bureau,
2017). However, sufficient commonalities exist between petrochemical operations and aircraft
maintenance to study the two industries together. Aircraft ground and petrochemical operations
share common workplace hazards. For example, hazardous noise is common in environments
where rotating equipment and motor drives are in service, and 24-hour operations are common
within shared workspaces. As well, shared workspaces have inherent potential for fall hazards.
Cargo compartments, wheel wells, and permitted confined workspaces include fuel cells, process
vessels, and towers. Personal protective equipment (PPE) and lockout tagout procedures are
required protection against known hazards. Within the industrial Transportation and
Manufacturing sectors, the volume of incident events is estimated to be thousands per year, and
resources are required to analyze the collected data (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006).
In 2017, 2.8 million nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses were reported in the United
States (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 2018). The incentive for organizations to influence the
reporting of injuries and illnesses is described in the U.S. House of Representatives Staff Report,
and is attributed to four factors: (a) Workplaces with low incident rates of recordable injuries and
illnesses are subject to less frequent inspections by OSHA, (b) Higher or lower incidences of
recordable injury rates influence the public image of an organization, (c) An organization that
demonstrates a desirable safety record is distinguished amongst other organizations, and (d)
Organizations are better positioned to offer and receive incentives when desirable safety records
are demonstrated (Miller, 2008).
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In 2015, the OSHA Severe Injury Reporting Program was implemented, and employers
reported 10,388 severe injury incidents; 26% of 7,636 hospitalization reports and 57% of 2,644
amputations were reported in the private-industry manufacturing sector (Michaels, 2016).
OSHA advises that employers in highly hazardous chemical operations exercise caution in
relying on metrics as the sole source of safety management measurements of past performance to
predict future safety efficacy (U.S. Department of Labor, 2018).
OSHA strongly encourages employers to report all incidents to include near miss events
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a, 2018). The parameters of a near miss are unclear to workers.
A study of 106 participants across 20 worksites in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry
determined that 68% of a segment of study participants (40 out of 59 pipefitters, operators, and
mechanics) are unclear about the near miss definition (Phimister, Oktem, Kleindorfer, &
Kunreuther, 2003).
Mandatory requirements to report incident events are focused on injuries and illnesses.
Reporting near miss events is obscured by mandatorily required events. Most near miss events
are not identified (Wald & Shojania, 2001), and 10 out of 12 aviation incident reporting systems
are confidential (Barach & Small, 2000). It is also assumed that complacency in attitudes
develops as the occurrence of accidents declines (van der Schaaf, 1992). Near miss events in
patient safety are compared to the aircraft industry. When it comes to patient safety, it is
difficult to quantify the benefits of near miss based on the outcome of the event partly because of
intervention on behalf of patient beneficence (Wald & Shojania, 2001).
The combination of organizational practices of reporting protocols and worker
misunderstanding of the near miss definition poses a challenge to realizing the goal of incident
reporting. In understanding the elements of near miss reporting, there is a need to understand
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how workers are challenged along with a greater need to understand how the goal of reporting is
interpreted. Amongst organizations, the methods of assessing levels of workplace safety vary
and are even disputed. Hence, near miss incident reporting in industry requires immediate
attention.
A result of the 2005 BP-Texas City Refinery Disaster and Worker Safety Hearing before
the 110th Congress was that OSHA and BP utilized process operations injury statistics as the
source of determining safety vulnerability. However, “how well the company follows up on near
misses, how well the company maintains its equipment, and how willing the company is to shut
down a process when there are problems” (p. 31) are more useful indicators of process safety
than injury statistics (The BP-Texas City Disaster as cited in Cohen, Smith, & Cohen, 2008).
Incident and accident reporting statistics are well-documented in the literature, but the worker
perspective of near miss events is limited.
Statement of the Problem
Amongst workers in aircraft ground and petrochemical operations, the relationship
between near miss reporting and the connection to the OSHA investigation goals to identify
hazards and prevent the recurrence of an incident are not well defined or understood.
Organizations publicly report safety incident metrics that measure mandatorily reported injuries,
but those reports are interpreted as measures of safety efficacy and under-emphasize the
importance of near miss incident data. Reporting a near miss is useful in preventing future
incidents (Hopkins, 2008; Morrison, 2004; National Safety Council [NSC], 2013; U.S.
Department of Labor, 2015a, 2018). In the chemical process industry, specific tools applied in
incident investigation are constantly refined to promote learning from incidents (Morrison,
2004).
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The volume of data collected poses an obstacle to learning, such that the ratio of data
collected is disproportional to the learning that results (Macrae, 2015). A lack of clarity in
understanding the requirements to report contributes to underreporting (Miller, 2008). A gap in
the knowledge exists amongst workers in understanding how hazard identification is related to
the goals of near miss incident reporting.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to understand how aviation ground and petrochemical
operations workers interpret the goals of near miss reporting through analysis of worker
descriptions of hazards and incidents in hazardous environments. OSHA and the National Safety
Council [NSC] advocate that near miss reporting is a vital component in reducing the potential
for more serious near miss incidents in the future (NSC, 2013; U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a,
2018). OSHA advocates that “All incidents – regardless of size or impact – need to be reported”
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a, p. 1) and implores employers to adopt a systems approach in
the investigation of accidents and incidents (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a).
A Brief Description of the Study
The near miss reporting study was developed to learn about workplace incidents and
hazards and to understand how workers perceive reporting. The ideal approach to studying
incidents is to interface with the workers closest to the process. I approached the design
considering that most near miss incidents are not identified (Wald & Shojania, 2001), 10 out of
12 aviation incident reporting systems are confidential (Barach & Small, 2000), and the decline
in accidents over time presents a challenge to the volume of accident data available for analysis
(van der Schaaf, 1992).
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Most importantly, concern for the beneficence of subjects shaped the protocol that
defined the study population. The criteria to participate were that subjects must have prior
experience working in either aircraft maintenance or petrochemical operations, must not be
presently working in either industry, and must be recently removed from working in either
industry within the last five years. No minimum length of experience was required.
The general qualitative method was applied to a nonrandom snowball sampling technique
to recruit eight subjects to participate in one-on-one interviews. Eight consent forms were
mailed to recruits, and one recruit expressed interest but did not return the mailed consent form
to participate in the interview. Further attempts to contact the prospective subject were
unsuccessful; thus, seven subjects were interviewed. The study represents over 170 years of
combined experience in aircraft maintenance and petrochemical operations.
Significance of the Study
The near miss study is significant because it provides a descriptive account of hazards
and incident interpretation from the workers who are closest to the process and will inform
practice about how near miss reporting is perceived. The ideal goal in safety operations to
reduce injuries must be centered on diminishing the existing hazards within the work
environment rather than adopting systems that respond to emergencies and diverting the focus
from the operating work process (Walline, 2014). When hazards are identified during the
process of work, efforts to mitigate, eliminate, or report the associated conditions depend on the
degree of motivation.
Regulatory and administrative governing agencies such as OSHA set standards and rules
of safe operation within industries, but safety policies and rules are elements of the bigger matrix
of safety management (Hodson, 2014). Organizations must support a clearer understanding of
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hazards in the workplace (Hodson, 2014), and organizations are poised to support understanding
when worker motivation to report incident events is understood. The challenge posed to
employers is to understand motivation. The elements of motivation are not stagnant, and
employee initiatives are subject to change (Bowen & Radhakrishna, 1991). Organizations focus
on training employees to meet the objectives of regulatory compliance but fail to consider the
motivation factors associated with training (Kincaid, 2015).
This study will inform organizations about the elements of concern in near miss reporting
within the context of attaining the OSHA goal of identifying hazards and preventing the
recurrence of the incident. To do so, four research investigation questions laid the foundation for
the focus of the study.
Key question one. In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical
operations describe hazards of the work environment?
Key question two. How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground
operations and petrochemical operations?
Key question three. How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?
Key question four. In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the
OSHA goals of identifying hazards and preventing the recurrence of an incident?
Operational Definitions Used in Industrial Environments
An important perspective on how the existence of latent hazards contributes to incident
events is described by Reason (1997):
Like pathogens, latent conditions – such as poor design, gaps in supervision, undetected
manufacturing defects or maintenance failures, unworkable procedures, clumsy
automation, shortfalls in training, less than adequate tools and equipment – may be
present from many years before they combine with local circumstances and active
failures to penetrate the system’s many layers of defenses. They arise from strategic and
other top-level decisions made by governments, regulators, manufacturers, designers and
organizational managers. The impact of these decisions spreads throughout the
organization, shaping a distinctive corporate culture (see Chapter 9) and creating error-
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producing factors within the individual workplaces. Latent conditions are present in all
systems. (pp. 10-11)
Hazards may exist in a latent state or may be visible. It is common practice in work
environments for organizations and workers to gain knowledge about latent and visible hazards
and the controls used to mitigate those hazards. The potential repercussions of near miss
reporting cannot be understated for all involved: the workers involved in the incident, the
organization, and the public (Wood, Murray, & Beckett, 2006).
Organizations employ near miss incident reporting in safety practice management
programs because the action represents an alert to conditions that signal anomalies and require
correction to prevent a recurrence of the incident. Safety incidents are often identified and
described in terms of the potential and severity for injury and damage. A near miss incident is a
type of precursor (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], 2015; van der
Schaaf, 1992), and tools such as accident precursor analysis (APA) are used to evaluate process
anomalies that have the potential to recur (Corcoran, 2004).
The intent of near miss incident reporting and analysis across industries is to stem the tide
of workplace safety incidents that have significant capacity and potential to cause injury, illness,
or to result in the loss or damage of equipment (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b). As defined
by the NSC (2013):
A near miss is an unplanned event that did not result in injury, illness, or damage – but
had the potential to do so. Only a fortunate break in the chain of events prevented an
injury, fatality or damage; in other words, a miss that was imminent. (para. 1)
A near miss is the type of incident in which a worker could have sustained an injury or
become ill, or equipment could have been damaged if the conditions were changed or different
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b). To impact the occurrence of future near miss events, the
definition of a near miss must be revised to capture a broader occurrence of incidents (Phimister
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et al., 2003). Phimister et al. (2003) defined a near miss incident as “An opportunity to improve
environmental, health and safety practice based on a condition, or an incident with potential for
more serious consequence” (p. 449).
Incident Classification and Incident Investigation
A worksite incident is distinguished from an accident by considering the context and
perception of the event. The occurrence of many incidents during worksite job operations is
preventable, whereas accidents are considered to occur at random or “by chance” and result in
injury or damage to equipment and property (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b). The practice of
incident investigation has been adopted by various workplaces, and the classification and
management of reported unsafe circumstances vary across industries. OSHA recommends that
worksites develop an incident investigation program (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b).
Although the reporting, analysis, and sharing of near miss data (collectively known as
“documentation”) are recognized as established practice in hazardous industries, challenges to
reporting incidents exist. Organizations adopt forms of incident investigation and analyze
incidents reactively, with a goal to mitigate recognized hazards and stem the reoccurrence of
incidents. Incident Investigation is the procedure applied to the analysis of an incident, which
utilizes root cause analysis tools to determine the contributing reasons for the occurrence of an
incident (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b).
The challenge exists in motivating workers to proactively report near miss incidents.
Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman’s (1959) theory divides Maslow’s (1943) needs hierarchy
into two categories of factors: hygiene and motivation. Organizations are more inclined to
neglect motivation factor needs over more readily recognized hygiene needs in workers
(Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014), as discussed in Chapter 2. The near miss reporting study applies
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the operational definition of an incident used by Phimister et al. (2003), and the near miss
reporting study describes a near miss incident as an opportunity to learn. In incident reporting,
opportunities to learn exist for both the worker and the organization. The near miss incident
reporting study presents a chance to learn from worker experiences.
Conclusion
Industries classified under NAICS Air Transportation and Petroleum and Coal Products
Manufacturing sectors are required to keep OHSA injury and illness records (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2017; U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b). Statistics of safety management are important
to organizations. All employers are mandated to report to OSHA any incident that results in a
fatality, amputation, in-patient hospitalization, or loss of eye (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015c).
Near miss reports are regarded as vital components of learning, yet the utility of reporting
to accomplish the OSHA goal is untapped. Incidents are classified in different ways. In Chapter
2, the conceptual framework of the perception of a near miss incident is presented through the
lens of Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs and Herzberg et al.’s (1959) motivation-hygiene
theory. Together, the theories guide understanding about how worker perception of near miss
reporting may not align with the organization, even though it is assumed that both the worker
and the organization share the same goals of identifying the hazard and preventing the recurrence
of an incident. In Chapter 2, a review of the literature describes what is known about incident
reporting and the opportunities that exist to learn from incidents.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The goal of reporting near miss incidents remains unmet in industry. In the United
States, employers in private industry reported nearly 2.9 million nonfatal workplace injuries and
illnesses in 2015 (BLS, 2017), and the incidence of near miss events is even higher (OSHA,
2015). A near miss is classified as an incident, and all incidents should be investigated (OSHA,
2015). Despite the decrease in rates of reported injury and illness incidents within the
Manufacturing and Oil and Gas Extraction sectors during 2015, significant injuries continue to
occur in the workplace (BLS, 2016). Near miss incident reporting is a reactive response to
learning and to track and document events. Therefore, organizations must understand the role of
worker motivation in learning.
Organizations use safety management programs to strive to prevent the occurrence of
incidents by establishing and engaging in safety management programs (Drupsteen, 2014), and
the milestones of attained accident rates are prominent components of organizational safety
programs (Zohar, 1980). The way in which workers perceive the need to mitigate hazards must
be understood through the lens of motivation.
As discussed in Chapter 1, a near miss or close call is classified as an incident, and all
incidents should be investigated (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a). Three key perspectives on
workplace incidents arise from the literature review. First, organizations use incident data
collection as components of safety programs. Secondly, conceptual frameworks and analytical
tools, such as learning from health and safety incidents and root cause analysis, apply past
incident events as opportunities to share lessons learned and improve best practices through
hazard identification. Thirdly, it is necessary to collect data from both near miss and accident
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events since both events are assumed to share identical root causes, and the frequency of accident
occurrences is low relative to incidents.
Chapter 2 begins with a perspective on accidents in organizations and the beliefs and
theories about accident causation, followed by a discussion about the distinction between
accident and incident definitions and the implications for worker health and safety. The
discussion continues by exploring organizational safety programs to determine how data are
utilized, specifically, data about near miss reporting. Next, Maslow’s (1943) theory of
motivation and subsequent theories frame worker needs in the context of incident data collection
and near miss reporting. Finally, a critique of the relationship between near miss reporting and
the goal of OSHA incident investigation is presented.
Throughout the chapter, Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation and subsequent theories
frame worker needs in the context of hazard identification, incident data collection, and near
miss reporting. Maslow’s (1943) theory is used to understand the inspiration for humans to
satisfy unmet needs (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014; Pardee, 1990). The chapter concludes by
summarizing the major topics of discussion and declaring an urgent need to inquire about how
workers perceive the relationship between near miss reporting and the dual goal to identify
hazards and prevent recurrence of an incident.
Organizational Perspectives on Accidents
The three key literature review take-aways that introduce this chapter are summed up in
Figure 1. Organizations utilize tools to collect and record data on incidents and accidents.
Incident data are necessary components of incident investigation. Employers use tools to collect
data on workplace incidents and accidents. The collected data are analyzed using tools such as
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root cause analysis. The lessons that result are extracted and shared. The conceptual framework
of the incident reporting process demonstrates the process of how lessons are shared.

Figure 1. Context of the literature review.

Some incidents in the chemical process industry share common root causes (van der
Schaaf, 1992). Challenges to collecting data are inherent to the process; and analytical tools
such as root cause analysis are used to inform organizations about recovery (van der Schaaf,
1992). Models and theories of accident causation and organizational learning frame the way
organizations perceive and manage safety systems in operations that drive change, such as
implementing corrective actions and sharing lessons learned with workers. The review of
literature examines the organization, the workers, and the relationship of both to near miss
reporting.
Historically, accidents have gathered attention in industrial workplaces. Corrective
actions to mitigate accidents have been undertaken since early industrial history, and some
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lessons learned have been adopted in industries. As early as 1811, DuPont gunpowder factory
responded to accidents by adopting rules at the Delaware Mill (Feinberg & Kolar, 2009). After
identifying the factors that contributed to the accidents, DuPont instituted corrective actions to
mitigate hazards (Feinberg & Kolar, 2009). Workers were supplied with specially designed
shoes, and alcohol was banned from the workplace (Feinberg & Kolar, 2009). Two hundred
eighty-eight explosions occurred during the period the mill operated between 1802 and 1921.
Two hundred twenty-eight people died (Feinberg & Kolar, 2009; New York Times, 1863; The
News Journal, 2015). The single action of eliminating a hazardous substance is insufficient in
preserving the health and safety of workers and the work environment since some hazards may
not be as easily recognized as others. When an incident event occurs and is investigated, the
analytical tools utilized must be applied with the goal to preserve the health and safety of
workers (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b).
Organizational Challenges
To the organization, the volume of incident events is estimated to be thousands per year
and requires resources to analyze the data collected (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006). Organizations
within some industry classifications are exempt from maintaining records of injury and illness
because of the size of the organization or because of NAICS classification, but all organizations
are mandated to report to OSHA any incident resulting in a fatality, amputation, in-patient
hospitalization, or loss of eye (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b, 2015c).
Since the OSHA law of 1970 was enacted, workplace injuries and fatalities have been
reduced by more than 65% through the cooperative efforts of OSHA administrators, workers,
and employers (U.S. Department of Labor, 2018). Prevention of workplace injuries, illnesses,
and fatalities in industrial environments is attributed to the implementation of regulatory
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standards such as machine guarding, lead, benzene, harmful chemicals, fall protection, confined
spaces, and other such standards developed by OSHA (U.S. Department of Labor, 2018).
Organizations are obligated by the OSHA General Duty Clause to provide safe workplace
conditions that are free of serious, identified hazards, and workplace hazards must be eliminated
or reduced (U.S. Department of Labor, 2018). Hazard identification is a key component of a
comprehensive safety program, and two principal approaches to hazard control are recommended
to organizations to reduce the incident risks: (a) Implement engineering principles of hazard
control and (b) Apply root cause analysis tools to the incident investigation process (U.S.
Department of Labor, 2018).
Industry worksites are required to keep and maintain records of worker injuries and
illnesses unless the worksite is exempt according to the NAICS workplace sector list (U.S.
Department of Labor, 2015c). Support activities for air transportation and petrochemical and
coal products manufacturing are two of the industry groups required to keep injury and illness
records (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015b). Some industry classifications are exempt from
maintaining records of injuries and illnesses because of the size of the organization or the
classification of the industry, but all organization classification types and sizes are mandated to
report an incident that results in a fatality, amputation, in-patient hospitalization, or loss of eye.
The diligence required to protect workers also poses challenges.
Challenges to Workers
Workers are challenged to understand the complexities of near miss reporting, and the
distinct connection to the goal of reporting is not apparent (Williamsen, 2013). The challenge to
workers yields two key assumptions.
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Assumption 1: The worker and the organization share the common goal to identify
workplace hazards and prevent the recurrence of an incident.
According to Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation, individuals are motivated to act
towards a goal based on existing individual needs, there are variations in paths toward reaching a
goal, and each need influences another. As each individual need is fulfilled, the need ceases to
be a factor of consideration in the path, and needs can be partially satisfied (Maslow, 1943).
Maslow’s (1943) five basic needs are: (a) Physiological, (b) Safety, (c) Love and belonging, (d)
Esteem, and (e) Self-actualization. To the extent that individual needs can be classified,
Maslow’s theory is applied in understanding how the common goals of near miss reporting are
shared between the organization and the worker yet yield a variety of interpretations and outputs.
The impetus to make a near miss report is examined through Maslow’s (1943) motivational lens
and extended theories by introducing a second assumption.
Assumption 2: A near miss event stimulates the prominence of a compelling individual
need.
Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation conceptualizes individual basic needs on a
continuum, and one need category can preside over another, depending upon the individual
demand of the prevailing need (Maslow, 1943). The lack of clarity in understanding the criteria
for reporting an incident as a near miss contributes to under-reporting (Miller, 2008).
The Reporting Challenge
An interview conducted by the U.S. Committee on Education and Labor with ORC
Worldwide, a public consulting agency, revealed two key findings: (a) Amongst employers,
there is a lack of clarity and confusion about reporting procedures for worker injuries and
illnesses and (b) There is a deficiency in the advice that OSHA staff administers to employers
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because OSHA staff is not adequately trained (Miller, 2008). The incentive for organizations to
influence the reporting of injuries and illnesses is attributed to four factors: (a) Workplaces with
low incident rates of recordable injuries and illnesses are subject to less frequent inspections by
OSHA, (b) Higher or lower incidences of recordable injury rates influence the public image of an
organization, (c) An organization that demonstrates a desirable safety record is distinguished
amongst other organizations, and (d) Organizations are better positioned to offer and receive
incentives when desirable safety records are demonstrated (Miller, 2008). In addition to
equipping organizations with a source of stakeholder value, some incident data collection is
mandatory.
Mandatory reporting system protocols are guided by agencies that have authority to
regulate operations and administer fines (Donaldson, Corrigan, & Kohn, 2000). Agencies with
regulatory authority define incidents and accidents and issue guidance about what must be
reported and how to make a report. For example, in an Air Traffic Organization (ATO) guidance
policy issued in 2011, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA; 2012) identifies mandatory
and voluntary reporting requirements for specific types of in-flight hazards that develop and
impact safe operations. The intent of the FAA order is to emphasize focus on the “why” of the
incident instead of “who” contributed (FAA, 2012).
Worksites assigned to Petroleum Refineries and Coal Products Manufacturing
(petrochemical operations) and Aircraft Maintenance and Repair Services NAICS classifications
are required to keep and maintain OSHA injury and illness records unless the industry sector is
classified as exempt, according to the NAICS list (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015c; U.S. Office
of Management and Budget, 2017). Some NAICS industry sectors are exempt from keeping
such records. For example, NAICS 4861, Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil; NAICS 4862,
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Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas; and NAICS 6111, Elementary and Secondary schools
are not mandated to report incidents to OHSA unless the result is a fatality, in-patient
hospitalization, amputation, or loss of an eye injury and illness (U.S. Department of Labor,
2015c).
Mandatory reporting system requirements represent opportunities for organizations to
evaluate the internal and external environments of safety management programs (Donaldson et
al., 2000). Examination and review of BLS, OSHA, and NAICS publications across 16 industry
sectors indicate that employer-reported OSHA injuries, illnesses, and fatalities data are collected
and maintained, but no reporting data on near miss statistics are published by such agencies.
Industries regulated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] must report incidents
in accordance with EPA guidelines (EPA, 2015a).
Voluntary incident reporting aims to prevent future near miss incidents (Donaldson et al.,
2000). The motivation to report a near miss must be examined as a pathway to reaching the goal
of proactively preventing a future injury, illness, or damage to property. Within organizations, a
report of a near miss event is often submitted in confidence, outside of public parameters, and
absent of penalties (Donaldson et al., 2000); however, the development of computerized Safety
Information Systems (SIS) in oil and gas process operations lessens the choice between
mandatory and voluntary reporting (van der Schaaf, 1992). In other words, there are
progressively fewer options to report an incident within systems that are electronically
monitored. The culture of the workplace environment influences the motivation to work
(Tampoe, 1993).

Figure 2. The work process environment concept.
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In Figure 2, near miss reporting is conceptualized within the context of the work
environment. Reading from left to right, the worker resides within the organization and interacts
with the working equipment in the process of the operation. The worker, the organization, and
the equipment represent the input to the process. The organization exists as the foundation from
which the worker operates and the equipment resides. A safe process incorporates the OSHA
goal to identify hazards and prevent the recurrence of an incident; therefore, the OSHA goal is
incorporated into the industrial process and resides within the process itself, from input through
output. The two vertical lines represent potential hazards to the process. The first line represents
visible hazards, and the second line represents latent hazards.
In the course of the work process, some hazards are visible and recognized, but others are
not. The worker interacts with the equipment and the organization in a dynamic capacity, and
the organization provides guidance and feedback about tasks that support operations and guide
work processes. The worker operates according to standards set by the organization and the
industry. The organization utilizes barriers to prevent exposure to potential hazards, and barriers
are represented by five blocks. During normal operations, tools equip the worker to perform
assigned tasks. The five vertically aligned barrier blocks identified from left to right are training,
personal experience, procedures, motivation, and lessons learned. The lines connecting the
boxes indicate that the control barriers work together. The foregoing elements are defensive
against incidents and are protective or control barriers against impediments to the work process.
When visible or latent hazards impede the production process, the result is an incident or
accident. A visible or latent hazard may reside internally or externally to the process and may
have sufficient potential to trigger an incident by penetrating one or multiple control barriers.
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The oblong shape represents the incident. When the incident is interrupted, and an accident is
averted, a near miss results. After a near miss event, communication is generated and functions
as training to learn from past lessons. The top two of four vertical circles represent the actions
taken after a near miss event. The top arrow points to the lagging indicator that connects the
near miss reporting circle to incident reporting, indicating that both are lagging indicators. The
bottom two vertical circles represent the actions taken after a near miss event. The top arrow
points to the lagging indicator that connects the near miss reporting circle to incident reporting,
indicating that both are lagging indicators. First, a near miss report is made. Next, the second
circle represents the incident investigation. According to OSHA, all incidents must be
investigated. A near miss event is an incident, and therefore must be reported.
The remaining two circles represent process audits and performance measurements and
are part of uninterrupted process operations. The arrows connect process audits to performance
measurements, and both are identified as predictive indicators. Performance measurements
proactively evaluate and measure process progress against an established standard. A process
audit is a more proactive action than a near miss report, and is, therefore, considered a leading
indicator. A near miss report is considered a more lagging indicator than a process audit because
the near miss event is an unplanned occurrence.
Next, the oblong represents the learning that results from the combined production
process, including the learning from near miss incidents, either from lagging indicators at the top
or predictive indicators at the bottom. The circle at the top of the oblong indicates the training is
a lagging indicator, generated after the near miss event. The learning opportunities that result
from near miss events are contextual, according to the near miss event itself. The sum of the
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production process is interpreted as a determined value. The arrow indicates the termination of
the process at the goal, and the goal is identified in the output box as “Identify the hazard and
prevent the recurrence.”
Beliefs and Theories of Accidents and Hazards
Near miss reporting and data analysis are utilized in petrochemical, aviation, and nuclear
industries as safety management tools, and associated analytical designs are recommended as
models significant enough to be adopted by the medical industry (Barach & Small, 2000).
Organizations are concerned with stemming the tide of the same incidents and avoiding the
heightened global public interest that results when incidents recur (Wood et al., 2006); they
utilize the analytical models as tools to manage hazards. The control of workplace hazards is a
proactive measure used to eliminate risk and control incident events.
The beliefs and assumptions of organizations are reflected in policies and work rules,
which workers are expected to follow (McGregor, 1960). The policies are applied to strengthen
safety programs, but workers must be motivated to act upon set policies. The conditions for
optimal workplace efficiency can be established through an understanding of how individual
needs are connected to the motivation to work (McGregor, 1960). Maslow’s (1943) theory of
motivation is the lens used to frame individual needs and the motivation to report a near miss.
Hierarchy of Controls
One method of applying hazard control in the workplace is to undertake a pro-active
review of a task with the aim of identifying potential hazards (Tixier, Albert, & Hallowell,
2017). Hazard control is the first choice in applying engineering principles to eliminate hazards
and is regarded as the most effective method (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
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[CDC], 2015b). The Hierarchy of controls is a model used to emphasize hazard control
priorities. Figure 3 illustrates the effectiveness of hazard controls from the most to least
effective.

Source: CDC (2015b, para. 2)
Figure 3. The hierarchy of hazard controls.

The hierarchy of controls is conceptualized as a two-tiered structure. At the top of the
pyramid, priority is applied to protective measures, which eliminate the hazard by physical
removal. A hazard is eliminated from a process by removing the need for the action or step, or
by changing the design, which eliminates worker exposure (CDC, 2015a; Weinberg, Bunin, &
Das, 2009). Secondary to elimination is the action to replace the hazardous element of concern
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by substitution. An example of how hazard controls is applied to hierarchical methods is
illustrated in an agricultural case study in California.
In an investigative case study designed to evaluate alternatives to pesticide use in
agricultural citrus fields where 27 agricultural workers became ill, Weinberg et al. (2009)
analyzed proposed methods to control pests of orange crops. The findings indicated that
eliminating the use of pesticides was a viable proposed method to isolate worker exposure, but
the sustained physical damage to the exterior of the fruit from pests would potentially result in
adverse consumer sentiment about the perceived quality of the fruit and increased economic risk
to the grower (Weinberg et al., 2009).
The findings also indicated that a reduction in the amount of active ingredients in the
pesticide was a viable proposed method of substitution to reduce worker exposure, but the high
population of pests would potentially render substitution methods prohibitive (Weinberg et al.,
2009). The value of applying elimination and substitution methods within the hierarchy of
controls was in the protection that both methods extended to workers by removing the hazard or
eliminating worker exposure in the process. The levels of engineering controls are primary
elements of defense in guarding against both the hazards that are visible and the visualized,
perceived hazards. Both hazard types are key elements of incidents. Engineering controls are
discussed next.
Engineering Controls
In Figure 3, the next priority hazard control method is identified as the engineering
control. Engineering controls are applied to existing workplace hazards that have not been
eliminated or substituted (CDC, 2015a). Engineering controls are effective in controlling worker
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exposure when hazards that are anticipated or recognized are mitigated at the onset (CDC,
2015b; Weinberg et al., 2009).
Protections from noise and heat and equipment barriers are examples of engineering
controls. Safety management programs use incident data as measures of organizational
effectiveness and apply the use of engineering controls to isolate hazards.
In a three-phase investigative study designed to examine the safety programs of five NSC
award-winning organizations, Cleveland, Cohen, and Smith (1979) described the characteristics
of five industries: (a) A textile manufacturer, (b) Three chemical plant manufacturers, and (c) A
photoflash consumer products manufacturer. Three key findings of the Cleveland et al. (1979)
study hold implications for applying engineering methods to hazard control in industrial
environments: (a) Plants with lower OSHA reported rates of accidents incorporated a balanced
use of engineering and non-engineering approaches to hazard control, (b) There was a stronger
organization commitment to safety programs in plants with lower OSHA-reported rates of
accidents, (c) Workers are motivated by feedback received from management, and (d) Workers
approach work more safely in secure working environments (Cleveland et al., 1979).
Many characteristics of industrial organizations are reflected in safety programs. OHSA
incident reporting data are tracked and valued, but the focus and emphasis on mandatory
reporting requirements is assumed to guide safety programs. OSHA strongly encourages
employers to report all incidents, including near miss events (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a).
The gathered data are utilized in ways that serve the needs of an organization.
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A Balanced Approach to Hazard Control Methods
The distinguishing quality performance components used to characterize industries in the
Cleveland et al. (1979) study indicate that positive safety records are interpreted as effective
execution of safety programs. Within the chemical process industry, trends in incident safety
statistics are used to drive safety efficacy (van der Schaaf, 1992). In other words, low incident
numbers have been associated with the perception of safe work practices, and that belief is still
prevalent amongst organizations today. In the Cleveland et al. (1979) study, the top five
organizations reported between 7,501,176 and 49,291,249 hours worked without a lost time
injury. Safety data are utilized in making changes in operations, and the changes are grounded in
beliefs. An understanding of such beliefs is gained by an examination of the administrative tools
utilized in hazard control.
As illustrated in Figure 3, administrative tools are applied to hazard control to manage
and change the working process (CDC, 2015a). Administrative controls commonly recognized
in industrial environments are training, procedures, alarm systems, and noise control. In a study
designed to evaluate noise exposure and hearing loss prevention in workers across 76 companies,
Daniell et al. (2006) found that organizations chose to use personal protection equipment (PPE)
as the primary means of noise hazards over administrative controls.
Audit tools are useful in measuring the effectiveness of practices that organizations adopt
(Reason, 1997). An audit tool was applied to measure safety climate in a Mearns, Whitaker, and
Flin (2003) study of offshore oil and gas workers across 13 installations in the United Kingdom
Continental Shelf. The Mearns et al. (2003) study analyzed self-reported questionnaire
responses from employee groups and found there were statistically significant differences in the
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way worker groups perceive installation managers and how workers are involved in health and
safety communication. Workers with one to five years of experience perceived installation
managers more positively and communicated more about health and safety matters than workers
with 6-10 years of experience (Mearns et al., 2003). The Mearns et al. (2003) study also found
there is no statistically significant difference in the willingness to report incidents amongst
different worker groups. The effectiveness of safety programs is associated with the level of
involvement and the degree of commitment from safety leaders. A key finding in Daniell et al.
(2006) determined that the use of hearing protection by workers was not maximized in hazardous
working environments, partly attributed to insufficient efforts on the part of the organization,
although 62% of workers reported regular use of hearing protection (Daniell et al., 2006).
The individual needs of the worker are central to the concept of near miss reporting. The
impact of an event extends beyond the worker to families, the environment, the organization in
which the event occurs, and the industry (Miller, 2008). Workers may or may not have a choice
in the decision to report an incident. Some industry sectors such as aviation and oil and gas are
mandated by regulatory agencies to report incidents.
The goal of incident reporting is to identify the hazard and prevent recurrence of the
incident (OSHA, 2015). It is suggested that the motivation path to the assumed mutual goal of
reporting a near miss incident is different for the worker and the organization; each path may be
motivated by separate needs. Data captured in incident reports are dependent upon
documentation and analysis of the occurrence itself, but are insignificant if workers are not
motivated to initiate reporting and population of the databank.
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Incidents, Accidents, and Culture of Near Miss Reporting
Perceptions of culture may not accurately reflect the underlying values of an organization
(Schein, 2010). In a study that examined the role of safety culture in predicting accidents, Neal
and Griffin (2006) found that a change in worker behavior was associated with a reduction in
accidents and that higher levels of safety participation over time corresponded with higher levels
of safety motivation. Commitment to safety practices in organizations is a measure of
organizational culture and identified by a dynamic involvement in safety practices, low turnover
rates, the status of safety officers, consistent training, the status of safety officials, and
identifiable safety promotion efforts. Safety practices are designed to prevent incidents.
In a study designed to examine error reporting amongst aircraft flight crew, Helmreich
and Merritt (2000) analyzed line operations safety audit data that were collected and reported by
expert observers. The findings indicated that line data were useful in facilitating error analysis
beyond the capacity of the flight data recorder by providing supplementary human factor data in
narrative form (Helmreich & Merritt, 2000). The attributes of effective safety cultures include
the utility of data collection systems that reflect intent to resolve errors, which are known to
organizations (Reason, 1998).
Cultural Components and Organizational Beliefs
There are primary and secondary organizational components that impact culture (Schein,
2010), and a greater focus on the secondary elements can render the culture unstable. Primary
mechanisms exist closer to the core of organizational beliefs (Schein, 2010). In other words, if
an organization aims to institute change about specific elements related to accident causation
such as near miss reporting, then the value of near miss reporting must first be deemed important
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to leadership (the primary component) before changes in procedure (the secondary component),
for example, will result in meaningful impact to culture. Motivation and culture are applied in
industrial contexts where the outcomes of accidents can be potentially detrimental.
In framing two distinct perspectives on the motivation of organizations, McGregor (1960)
theorized that organizational beliefs span a bandwidth of two extreme limits identified as Theory
X and Theory Y (McGregor, 1960). Within an organization, motivation is fostered by the types
of elements within the working environment, and a complex relationship exists between the
safety culture and the climate (Neal & Griffin, 2006). Elements in industrial environments
include hazardous environments in which production, training, worker safety, and incident
events are managed within organizations.
Organization Perception of Accident Theories
Theory X represents an organizational belief in the absence of motivation in individuals;
therefore, guidance and structured management by the organization is required to manage people
(McGregor, 1960). Theory Y represents autonomy and less dominance of management such that
the organizational posture assumes individuals are innately motivated to work and are
contributors to the work process. The value of learning from incidents and sharing information
amongst refineries is globally acknowledged as a necessary industry key practice in preventing
incident recurrence and controlling public sentiment, but there are obstacles to sharing data
(Wood et al., 2006). Therefore, the approach to near miss reporting in organizations depends on
how organizations perceive worker motivation.
To analyze a near miss event, it is assumed that the occurrence of an incident is
acknowledged. Near miss modeling is simulated by retrieving data from workers and equipment
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associated with the event from three sources: (a) Workers involved in the incident who
voluntarily report an event or are mandated to do so, (b) Equipment that records occurrences of
out-of-limit operating perimeters, and (c) Other observers of the event who are not directly
involved in the incident (van der Schaaf, 1992). Prior to the year 2000 publication of To Err is
Human: Building a Safer Health System, a prevailing public perception existed that attributed
medical accidents to human error (Donaldson et al., 2000). The Donaldson et al. (2000) report
focused on the delivery of healthcare and found that most incidents in healthcare were attributed
to failures in the system.
Incidents are related to the systems and environments in which the incidents occur
(Donaldson et al., 2000). Similar perceptions about safety relationships exist in industrial
environments. Health, safety, and environmental (HSE) indicators are used to measure and track
safety performance (Broadrib, Boyle, & Tanzi, 2009). In 2005, 15 souls were lost in the BP
Texas City incident. A recommendation of the independent review panel and BP was to
acknowledge and identify process safety incident events as proactive opportunities to learn
(Broadribb et al., 2009). A key finding of the independent panel was that the potential severity
of events that occurred less frequently was not identified in existing metrics (Broadribb et al.,
2009). The Heinrich (1941) Iceberg theory of incident causation is prevalent in the literature,
OSHA publications, and in practice and is used as a model that guides safety management
programs.
The Heinrich Model
The Heinrich (1941) model is used to support the organizational practice of translating
statistical data into measures of safety.
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In Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach, Heinrich (1941) presented his
philosophy about the sequence of an accident by using dominos to demonstrate how “an accident
is merely one link in the chain [of events]” (p. 14). Heinrich (1941) also likened the progression
of an accident that could have been prevented to a link of related elements. According to
Heinrich (1941), individual character and the presence of workplace hazards are contributing
factors in the accident chain link (Heinrich, 1941).
Heinrich (1941) also estimated the frequency of accidents of the same type. Heinrich
(1941) analyzed 12,000 closed-claim-file insurance records classified as Industrial cases and
63,000 records from plant owners classified as Other cases. Heinrich (1941) theorized the results
of the analysis to conclude that most accidents are caused by human error (Heinrich, 1941).
Furthermore, Heinrich (1941) further estimated severity of the volume of accidents that occur
amongst same category types. Based on the review of 330 accident cases of comparable
characteristics, 300 cases resulted in no major injuries, 29 cases resulted in minor injuries, and
one case resulted in a lost time injury (Heinrich, 1941). “The 300-29-1 ratio” (Heinrich, 1941, p.
27) is widely represented and used in industrial environmental health and safety programs
(Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004).
Heinrich (1941) recognized early that gathering accident data with the goal to determine
cause was important to the insurance industry. But the validity of the model in stemming the
trend of incidents questioned specifically how the model is applied in the strategy to prevent
incidents today. Industry has come to interpret the Heinrich ratio estimates as accident principles
and aligns safety management programs aligned with Heinrich’s accident ratio estimate. The
commonly represented triangle representative of the Heinrich ratio is utilized throughout
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industry (Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004) and is useful in illustrating and demonstrating that
workplace safety deserves keen attention and that incidents within a system share a degree of
relatedness and potential commonalities of root cause. Heinrich (1941) was an advocate for
investigating the underlying causes of accidents as a major part of the philosophy on accident
causation, and Heinrich believed the cause of the majority of workplace accidents (98%) are
preventable (Heinrich, 1941). When near miss events are framed without regard to the potential
effects, then each tier of the iceberg is equally subject to a near miss event. In other words, the
concept of incident occurrence includes a compounding quality in which less significant
incidents precede more severe occurrences. The iceberg theory is widely utilized by institutions
in the measurement of worksite safety and health (Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004).

Figure 4. The Heinrich (1941) ratio (triangle) is adapted and superimposed in the all-incident
learning potential model.
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Figure 4 illustrates how the Heinrich (1941) accident ratio (triangle) is superimposed and
adapted in a representation of all incidents. All incidents are represented on a continuum and are
not distinguished by incident category or accident type. The adapted incident model and the
Heinrich model share the common goal to prevent accidents, but the adapted model is not
statistically based. Instead, the focus of the adapted incident model is to recognize that all
incidents have potential for learning. The goal must go beyond inquiring about the cause of the
incident.
The Near Miss Reporting Goal and the Heinrich Model
To drive understanding about the consequences of unsafe operations, organizations must
gain more insight into how individuals are motivated to operate safely within work
environments. The assumption must then be made that both the organization and the individual
share the two common goals of incident reporting as prescribed by OSHA: (a) Identify the
hazard and (b) Prevent the recurrence of the incident (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a). It has
become a focus of industry to emphasize statistics in the process of mandatory reporting. Near
miss management systems require that lessons are shared broadly across a system in which
events are recognized and analyzed (van der Schaaf, Lucas, & Hale, 1991), but the relevance of
near miss reporting can be overlooked by organizations because the event itself sometimes
leaves negligible visible evidence of the occurrence.
Sometimes, the Heinrich ratio is misinterpreted when the concept is applied to near miss
events. Acquiring knowledge and learning about the causes of accidents through the analysis of
past incident data establishes a base from which potential prioritization of safety growth effort
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can be examined (Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004). Heinrich’s ratio of accidents represents
commonality of causal relationships amongst events, such that, assuming similar circumstances
of occurrences, the model can be utilized by organizations to convince workers in
conceptualizing the model as motivation to report near miss events (Wright & van der Schaaf,
2004). It is important to distinguish Heinrich’s intent of establishing a common cause of
occurrences ratio from the commonly misinterpreted concept of a common cause of
consequences.
Common Cause Hypothesis and the Heinrich Model
In a study designed to conduct an empirical test to evaluate the Heinrich model for
validation and interpretation of the common cause hypothesis, Wright and van der Schaaf,
(2004) conducted an empirical test of the common cause hypothesis. The common cause
hypothesis is Heinrich’s theory that near miss events (identified as Substandard Practices at the
bottom of the triangle in Figure 4) and accidents (represented at a higher level in Figure 4) share
common causes. The Wright and van der Schaaf (2004) study examined railroad incidents in
one organization in the United Kingdom. The study utilized formal inquiries, signals passed at
danger (SPAD) investigations, and report analysis. The Wright and van der Schaaf (2004) study
included incidents with a high potential for injury such as crossing a red signal without the
authority to do so. SPAD investigations consisted of an interview by a manager (with the rail
driver and the signal detector who received the report) and artifacts, as applicable.
The Wright and van der Schaaf (2004) study concluded that the common cause
hypothesis is conditionally supported by the results. Specifically, of the 21 types of causes, three
were proportionally significant across three consequence levels: (a) Injury and Fatality, (b)
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Damage, and (c) Near Miss. Analysis of eight studies identified from the literature examined
concluded, “the hypothesis has not been properly understood or tested” (Wright & van der
Schaaf, 2004, p. 102). Incident investigation utilizes the root cause analysis approach to analyze
incidents (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a), and both accident and incident events are assumed
to share common root causes (Heinrich, 1941; van der Schaaf, 1992).
The Swiss Cheese Model
The degree of near miss potential in personal safety cannot be reliably predicted without
data. Therefore, a distinction between personal safety and process safety need is warranted when
considering how near miss reporting is conceptualized. The Swiss cheese model (Reason, 1997)
is descriptive of process safety hazards inherent to workplace operations. Specifically, the model
describes how latent hazards exist within the barriers to the process outcome, and a compromised
barrier represents a potential incident (Reason, 1997).
There is no implied distinction of incident severity in the Swiss cheese model, and the
implied degree of risk is determined by the strength of each process barrier. The Reason (1997)
model is useful in illustrating the potential for a near miss. There is no implied classification of
incident severity potential as in the Heinrich model. According to Reason (1997), some hazards
are latent, and are not as easily identified. A near miss is theorized to occur when the holes in
the Swiss cheese are lined up sufficiently for a hazard to penetrate, and a near miss results
(Reason, 1997). The goal of reporting a near miss is to identify the hazard and prevent the
recurrence of the incident. As such, a near miss must result in an opportunity for organizational
learning.
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Applying the Process of Root Cause Analysis in Hazard Identification
When an incident occurs, it is important to develop a comprehensive understanding of the
elements that contribute to the occurrence. Root cause analysis (RCA) is an approach used to
understand the underlying causal factors of an incident and to prevent recurrence (U.S.
Department of Energy [DOE], 1992). The RCA is a retrospective action often applied in the
process of examining a near miss event. Incident analysis must be applied with the knowledge
that the process progresses from the top down and that there is commonality in relationships
amongst incident types (van der Schaaf, 1991). Causal analysis, as described by Phimister et al.
(2003) is designed “to determine what are the direct and underlying factors that enable an
incident or unsafe condition” (p. 453).
Incident reporting has been used amongst organizations but the results can be described
as less than stable, resulting in more immediate changes to procedures, re-training, and
disciplinary actions (van der Schaaf et al., 1991). The utility in collecting incident and accident
data is the shared compatibility in root causes; and the data from near miss incidents is used to
build chemical process models (van der Schaaf, 1992). In other words, collecting near miss data
is important to safety management practices; therefore, collecting near miss data is practical and
necessary.
When applying causal analysis, determinations of root cause must go beyond the
immediate and direct solutions to target a goal of correction (Phimister, 2003). OSHA strongly
encourages employers to investigate all workplace incidents—both those that cause harm and the
“close calls” that could have caused harm under slightly different circumstances—and root cause
analysis method is applied to investigate incidents (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a). The
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design of an incident investigation must include guidance and training, and collaboration
between leadership and workers is required (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a). In considering
the practical application of the process of collecting near miss data, it is important the incident
causation approach “will always try to get as far to the bottom of the iceberg as possible and not
stop at superficial descriptions of only the immediate events leading to an accident and its shortterm consequences” (van der Schaaf, 1992, pp. 21-22).
Implications for Workers
Although OSHA (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a) advocates that employers should
investigate all incidents, some organizations classify incidents based on severity and conduct
investigations as such. But how do workers know what incidents should be reported? The
Energy Department underscores the importance of root cause analysis by describing five
essential phases in the development process in the investigation and reporting of an incident
(DOE, 1992). Table 1 identifies the essential elements of the root cause analysis tool. The five
phases of root cause analysis are: (a) Data collection, (b) Assessment and method of analysis, (c)
Apply corrective actions, (d) Inform, and (e) Follow-up. In medical environments, methods of
analyses are applied to understand the types of errors that develop out of an unclear
understanding of the problem and insufficient knowledge (Donaldson, 2008).
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Table 1
Phases and Essential Components of Root Cause Analysis
Phase
Description
Phase I: Data Collection

Prevent data loss by collecting data as soon as
possible
Capture conditions during all phases: before, during,
and after
Include personnel actions and environmental
conditions

Phase II: Assessment and
Methods of Analysis

Apply methods of analysis to determine the root
cause. The method applied must include four
elements
(a) The problem
(b) The significance
(c) Existing conditions and actions before the
problem
(d) The cause of each preceding step in the
sequence of events
The root cause is the fundamental cause in the
sequence to which corrective action can be applied

Phase III: Corrections Actions

Protect health and safety of workers, the public, and
the environment

Phase IV: Inform

The results of the analysis and mitigating actions
results are reported in the Occurrence Reporting and
Processing System (OPRS)

Phase V: Follow-Up

Assess the implementation of corrective actions

Source: U.S. Department of Energy (1992)

The Near Miss Reporting Challenge
Despite the benefits to reporting near miss events, some employers fail to report severe
workplace injuries and face the probability of monetary fines and more frequent inspections from
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OSHA (Michaels, 2016). An update to the schedule of employer penalties for violations of
workplace rules became effective April 2, 2019 and is published in the OSHA memo titled “2019
Annual Adjustments to OSHA Civil Penalties” (U.S. Department of Labor, 2019). A list of the
minimum and maximum civil penalties assessed across categories of violation is displayed in
Table 2. A review of the table indicates a low tolerance for willful or repeated employer
violations (U.S. Department of Labor, 2019).

Table 2
Adapted from OSHA Employer Maximum and Minimum Amounts for Civil Penalties, 2019
Type of Violation
Penalty Minimum
Penalty Maximum
Serious

$947 per violation

$13,260 per violation

Failure to Abate OtherThan-Serious

$0 per violation

$13,260 per violation

Willful or Repeated

$9,472 per violation

$132,598 per violation

Posting Requirements

$0 per violation

$13,260 per violation

Failure to Abate

N/A

$13,260 per day unabated beyond
the abatement date (generally
limited to 30 days maximum)

Source: U.S. Department of Labor (2019)

In a study of 106 participants across 20 worksites in the chemical and pharmaceutical
industry, 68% of a segment of study participants (40 out of 59 pipefitters, operators, and
mechanics) had an unclear understanding about the elements that constitute and define a near
miss (Phimister et al., 2003). In petroleum refining and chemical plant process operations, the
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use of hazard identification methods such as near miss reporting, job safety audits, process
deviation reports, and the preventative maintenance of equipment are more effective as
indicators of workplace safety vulnerability than utilizing statistical reports of injury and illness
incidents (Miller, 2008).
When considering how needs are classified, Maslow’s (1943) theory is applied in
understanding how the common goal of near miss reporting is shared by the organization and the
worker, yet has the potential to yield variety in interpretations and outputs. As such, the impetus
to make a near miss report is examined through the motivational lens. The value of learning
from incidents and sharing information is globally acknowledged as a necessary industry key
practice in preventing incident recurrence and in controlling public sentiment, but there are
obstacles to sharing data (Wood et al., 2006). The differences in motivation needs amongst
workers are acknowledged and vary depending on the work environment (Tampoe, 1990).
Motivation and Limitations
The motivation to report a near miss must therefore be understood as a pathway to
reaching the goal of proactively preventing a future injury, illness, or property damage. As such,
the process of incident investigation should be outlined, and the motivation to report a near miss
incident must be understood by the organization and worker. The mandate of OSHA law of
1970 requires the BLS to collect accurate statistics about reported injuries, illnesses, and
fatalities that occur in the workplace (Miller, 2008). BLS data and workplace record-keeping
indicate that under-reporting of incidents is problematic and chronic (Miller, 2008).
U.S. Department of Labor (2015a) contends that “All incidents – regardless of size or
impact – need to be reported” (p. 1) and advocates for employers to adopt a systems approach in
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the investigation of accidents and incidents. The philosophy that “most harmful workplace
incidents are wholly preventable” is the foundation of a systems approach in which the root
cause of an incident can be identified to discover deficiencies within safety management systems
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a, p. 2).
Contributing Elements
Knowledge of factors that contribute to the development of incidents is helpful to
understand the context of near miss documentation. OSHA refers to the practice of analyzing
worksite incidents and developing plans to mitigate process hazards as Incident Investigation
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2015a). Since the analysis of a near miss occurs after the incident,
the delay in the process distorts the report (Reason, 1997), and a comprehensive near miss
management system requires more than near miss analysis (Reason, 1997; U.S. Department of
Labor, 2015a).
The findings of near miss analyses are communicated to workers to avoid duplication of
the same actions, to learn from past incidents, and to adopt corrective actions (U.S. Department
of Labor, 2015a). The challenges to reporting near miss events include the limiting factor of the
root cause analysis tool that restricts advancement of reporting the root cause to the preceding
immediate cause (van der Schaaf, 1992). The projected learning intended from near miss
incident reporting is hindered by “overdissemination” and “underdissemination” of the shared
lessons (Phimister et al., 2003, p. 457), such that the sheer volume of lessons distributed in
sufficiently high volume can overwhelm recipient workers, and when shared lessons are
distributed to the originating reporter only, the utility of the lesson is limited to the worker
(Phimister et al., 2003).
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Motivation and Near Miss Reporting
Abraham Maslow’s (1943, 1968) basic needs in individuals have been established
through empirical studies. A quantitative study was designed to measure the validity of
relationships amongst Maslow’s (1943) five basic needs: (a) Physiological, (b) Safety, (c) Love
and belonging, (d) Esteem, and (e) Self-actualization (Lester, Hvezda, Sullivan, & Plourde,
1983). In the correlational study, Lester et al. (1983) found that a relationship exists amongst the
physiological, safety, love and belonging, esteem, and self-actualization needs in individuals, and
that higher levels of need satisfaction are associated with higher levels of psychological health
(Lester et al., 1983). The implications for the near miss reporting study is that individual worker
needs must be considered in the action of near miss reporting. The needs hierarchy structure is
sometimes misinterpreted.
No single need exists independently (Maslow, 1943). In describing how a more
compelling need displaces another need during an urgent situation, Maslow (1943, 1968)
described the physiological needs as the more independent of the other need categories and less
dependent on motivations (Maslow, 1943), indicating that individual need categories exist on a
continuum; as a need is satisfied, the need no longer exists.
Maslow (1943, 1968) further distinguished being needs, or B-needs (Love and belonging,
Esteem, and Self-actualization), from deficiency needs, or D-needs (physiological and safety).
The distinction lies in the characterization of the need. When a deficiency need occupies the
position of a prevailing need, the need can command a compelling position in terms of priority to
be satisfied (Maslow, 1943). Maslow (1968) suggests that, as self-actualization develops,
individuals perceive a clearer interpretation of the meaning of the actions of others. The
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implications for near miss reporting is that, in a near miss event, the prevailing need will
originate from any need category and is not dependent upon the fulfillment of a need of any
lower category.
Organizations can apply worker motivation to learning from near miss incident
experiences when an understanding of Herzberg et al.’s (1959) two categories of individual
needs is established. Herzberg et al.’s (1959) theory states that levels of job satisfaction are
influenced by motivation factors of esteem and self-actualization needs, and levels of job
dissatisfaction are driven by levels of need that are lower on Maslow’s (1943, 1968) needs
hierarchy. Maslow (1968) aligns individual basic needs with essential body nutrients. Within
the framework of Maslow’s hierarchy of individual needs, hygiene and motivation needs
regulate motivation (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014). Motivation results from the application of
hygiene and motivation needs applied. The implication for near miss incident reporting is that
job satisfaction is a desirable tenet, and opportunities to motivate workers to increased levels of
job satisfaction will result in a response toward near miss incident reporting.
Applying Maslow’s Hierarchy
A mixed methods study designed to assess levels of need satisfaction found that the
fulfillment of the self-actualization need is dependent upon factors inside and outside the work
environment, and the anticipated levels of self-actualization amongst the sample were less than
expected (Shoura & Singh, 1999). The Shoura and Singh (1999) study utilized self-reporting
questionnaires from a target sample of 19 construction engineers to determine levels of
fulfillment in important and less important areas of life.
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The analysis of the Shoura and Singh (1999) study resulted in the development of a
recommended set of three self-actualization boundaries from which the targeted organization
could use to develop workers: (a) Meaningfulness of tasks, (b) Self-sufficiency through
continuous training, and (c) A clearly defined role in the mission of the organization (Shoura &
Singh, 1999). The Shoura and Singh (1999) finding implies that near miss reporting protocol
should be purposeful, incorporate training, and aligned to a goal.
Wahba and Bridwell (1976) analyzed the results of worker responses from historical data
in 10 studies for evidence of human motivation to do work according to Maslow’s (1943) theory
of motivation. The field of study participants in the 10 studies included a variety of work
disciplines such as factory and clerical workers, operators, nurses, librarians, bank workers,
supervisors, and managers. Participants provided self-reported responses to job attributes that
translated into categories of human need as identified by Maslow (1943). Participants ranked
responses on a structured scale designed according to the measure of importance of the need and
the level of satisfaction gained from the fulfillment of the need. The range of participants in 12
samples from smallest to largest was 72-380; 2 of the 10 studies each had two samples. The
historical data were tested for the presence of three existing elements: (a) Maslow’s (1943) five
categories of need, (b) Overlap and independence amongst adjacent and nonadjacent need
categories, and (c) Independence of the five needs from unrelated factors.
The analysis of Wahba and Bridwell (1976) found that no one study examined indicated
that each of Maslow’s (1943, 1968) categories of needs is independent of another need category.
The implication for the near miss reporting study is that each category of need must be
considered when motivating workers to make a near miss report. A comparison study of
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Maslow’s (1943) Need Theory and Herzberg et al.’s (1959) Motivation-Hygiene Theory
determined that differences and similarities exist between the two theories, and there is utility in
applying both concepts together (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014).
Maslow’s (1943, 1968) theory identifies needs such as protection, food, friendship, selfworth, and reaching full potential within the needs categories of Safety, Physiological,
Belonging, Esteem, and Self-actualization that individuals seek to satisfy, and when a need is
satisfied, the need no longer exists and does not motivate individual behavior (Maslow, 1943,
1968; Pardee, 1990). Herzberg et al.’s (1959) Hygiene (Two-Factor) theory identifies physical
satisfiers and dissatisfiers in the work environment as the origins of individual motivation.
In the Ozguner and Ozguner (2014) comparison study, the researchers considered the
context of motivation across both theories. The findings indicate contention in applying the
Two-factor theory such that Herzberg et al.’s (1959) satisfiers (motivators) correspond with two
of Maslow’s (1968) five needs (esteem and self-actualization), and Herzberg et al.’s (1959)
nonsatisfiers (hygiene factors that correspond with Maslow’s remaining physiological, safety,
and belonging needs) pose a challenge to managers (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014). The challenge
here lies in the capacity of managers to distinguish amongst worker needs and to recognize
agents of motivation (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014).
Hygiene factors are conceptualized in terms of hazards that exist in the environment
(Duttweiler, 1986; Pardee, 1990), and as such, hazards must be recognized and controlled. In
other words, if Herzberg et al.’s (1959) hygiene factors align with Maslow’s (1943, 1968)
physiological, safety, and belonging needs, then organizations must be sure to include
considerations of the need to mitigate hazards when seeking to understand elements of worker
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motivation. The findings in the Brenner, Carmack, and Weinstein (1971) study (as cited in
Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014) indicate that respondents report job satisfaction and job
dissatisfaction from motivating factors and hygiene factors, resulting in the conclusion that
dissatisfaction needs can be satiated by hygiene factors, but hygiene factors will not motivate
workers (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014). Taken together, the satisfaction of hygiene elements
(nonsatisfiers) can result in the achievement of motivation factors, but by itself, a hygiene factor
is not a motivator of workers (Ozguner & Ozguner, 2014). The implication for near miss
reporting is that satisfying D-needs/hygiene factors can result in the achievement of Bneeds/motivation factors, and D-need/hygiene needs do not motivate workers.
Conclusion
A review of the literature determined that organizations highly regard safety statistics. A
few studies offer insight into the perceptions of the industrial worker such as Lukic, Margaryan,
and Littlejohn (2013) and van der Schaaf (1992). The participants in most studies include safety
professionals, managers, and combinations that include some process operators. Few studies
distinguish process safety from personal safety needs in reporting a near miss. Further, process
safety is emphasized over personal safety in most studies, and the ways in which a near miss is
defined varies and is unclear to workers. When workers are motivated to fulfill motivation factor
needs, action toward near miss reporting will result. A gap in the literature exists in
understanding how near miss reporting is interpreted by industrial workers and how the action of
reporting relates to the OSHA goal of identifying the hazard and preventing recurrence of the
incident. Worker motivation must be understood in the context of worker needs and job
satisfaction. Organizations must determine ways of identifying worker needs in near miss
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incident reporting and apply efforts to satisfy identified needs. It is important to understand the
actions involved in reporting near miss events to determine and measure the extent to which
OSHA goals of incident investigations are met.
Summary
Accidents and incidents occur in industrial environments, and organizations maintain
statistics of events. Organizations align beliefs and theories of accident causation with
management practices. The hazard control triangle is used and applied as a guide to different
ways or methods to prioritize and control worker exposure to hazards in the work environment.
examine studies that apply methods of prioritization to control worker exposures. The goals of
near miss reporting are unclear to workers. The conceptual framework is used to illustrate how a
near miss is positioned within the production path. Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation is
used to demonstrate how actions are connected to individual needs. The methodology applied in
conducting the study is described in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

The goal of the near miss study was to understand how workers in aviation ground and
petrochemical operations interpret the goal of near miss reporting by examining how workers
define hazards, how a near miss incident is defined, and how the action of reporting is related to
the incident reporting goal. This chapter describes how the plan to collect data was executed.
The anticipated challenges to data acquisition are discussed.
A review of the literature established the significance and essence of near miss reporting
as an extension of incident data collection practices common to safety management programs in
industries. Specifically, reporting systems of substantive value are dependent upon the input of
workers closest to the process who are connected to the reporting goal. The strategies employed
in data collection must be aligned with the purpose of the study (Roberts, 2010). A purposeful
approach to the methodology requires specific knowledge of the problem (Roberts, 2010).
If workers are to connect to the goal and subsequently apply lessons learned from
incident reporting opportunities, more clarity in the definition and purpose of reporting incident
events is needed. It is established that corporations promote and publicly emphasize mandatorily
reportable incident statistics as a reflection of how safety programs are managed, but the value of
near miss event data is not sufficiently recognized by workers within systems that present
obstacles to reporting. The approach to an inquiry about near miss reporting was rooted in the
assumption that the worker and the organization share the common goal to identify hazards and
prevent the recurrence of an incident
In the next sections that follow, I describe the approach to the inquiry, followed by a
description of how the design was developed. A description of appropriate participants
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developed out of the design. In other words, the participant parameters posed a potential
challenge to recruiting. Following the description of participants is the sampling procedure.
Next, the interview protocol is outlined. A description of the data analysis precedes the
discussion about the extent of validity of the data. The perspectives of the researcher and the
participants are considered. Finally the study limitations are outlined, and the contents of the
chapter are summarized at the end.
Inquiry Approach
The inquiry utilized a general qualitative, nonexperimental approach through purposeful
snowball sampling and aimed to understand how workers interpret the goals of near miss
reporting. A generalized qualitative approach utilizes tools such as surveys, questionnaires, and
interviews to capture the bounds of the situation in a broader context (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Applying a qualitative approach to describe how workers interpret near miss reporting is
essential in understanding the objective aspects of the near miss content. For example, there may
be differences in the way that workers practically perceive the common theoretical purpose of
reporting a near miss incident.
The general qualitative method of inquiry was utilized to document the “lived
experiences” of seven participants (Creswell, 2007, p. 57). A basic qualitative approach utilizes
the perspectives of people to construct detail in meaning by capturing experiences using
descriptive methods such as interviews, observations, and data analysis (Merriam, 2009). It is
assumed the reader of the study is inclined to seek out a logical construction of the near miss
reporting perspective argument. The structure of the qualitative approach utilizes the rich
descriptions from participants (Denzin, 1989).
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In a qualitative approach, the needs of the study drive the approach to data collection
(Caelli, Ray, & Mill, 2003; Roberts, 2010). The approach to the study was framed in the belief
that there is variation in the way workers understand the elements of near miss reporting. Each
near miss incident is unique in circumstance, and as such, the qualitative methodology applied is
suited to capture and understand individual experiences.
The approach was based on a logical, “best fit” for the near miss inquiry based on
learning about the perspectives in workplace environments by capturing the voice of workers.
Participants described the components of near miss reporting, and the descriptions were the
platform for understanding relationships between near miss reporting and the goals of hazard
identification. Each near miss incident is unique in circumstance.
A general qualitative approach was applied to capture data and gain a clearer
understanding about how near miss events are perceived. The unit of analysis guides the focus
of the data collection (Starks & Trinidad, 2007). Furthermore, the goal of sampling to acquire
rich, descriptive data is to understand the common elements and the reality amongst the sample
(Starks & Trinidad, 2007). Factual content is expected to result from basic qualitative research
(Sandelowski, 2000). In addition to descriptive content, the relationship between objective
descriptions and subjective reflections reflect intentionality in meaning (Ehrich, 1996). Basic
qualitative research utilizes participant experiences to understand and interpret meaning
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). In this study, participants shared common experiences of working in
industrial environments and common knowledge of incident reporting. The rationale for
understanding how workers interpret the relationship between the elements of near miss
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reporting and the OSHA goal is to listen to what workers have to say within environments where
incidents have high potential consequences.
Development of the Design
The development of the study design was also based on my own perspectives and views.
I have multiple years of experience in the petrochemical and aircraft industries that enable
insight into the benefits and challenges of incident reporting. I exercised care in interpreting and
validating the study results. Validation in reporting the results must be based on the
interpretation that is derived, and not on the data itself (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). In
other words, I would be wrong to invalidate worker descriptions that did not align with my
beliefs. It was important for me to listen objectively to what the participants had to say and to
capture the multiple realities of worker experiences,
In the near miss study, it was assumed that both the worker and the organization shared
the common goals of hazard identification and preventing the recurrence of an incident. My
assumption was grounded in the logic that workers are vested in preserving personal safety and
organizations are motivated to manage resources in an efficient way. It was also assumed that
accidents and incidents share common root causes (van der Schaaf, 1992). Most near miss
events are not identified (Wald & Shojania, 2001), 10 out of 12 aviation incident reporting
systems are confidential (Barach & Small, 2000), and anonymous reporting poses challenges
(Barach & Small, 2000).
The credibility of the near miss reporting study is identified by criteria that represent
standards of quality. The analytic lens of the researcher, the researcher position, the fit of
methodology to methods, and rigor (Caelli et al., 2003) are standards of quality that were used to
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support the selected methods of inquiry. My position is an important component of the near miss
reporting study because two perspectives of personal safety, at a minimum, exist in reporting an
incident. First, the occurrence of a specific event is reported. Secondly, a generalized plan is
constructed to mitigate and prevent future recurrence of like incidents. In other words, in one
perspective, an incident occurs at the detriment of another element, creating a potential for future
benefits in learning.
My position is that a difference in motivation to report a near miss incident exists.
Understanding the elements of motivation and how worker needs are prioritized must be
considered. Near miss reporting is an established protocol applied in the identification of
hazards and preventing incident recurrence. My position assumed that near miss reporting
systems are underutilized by workers and organizations. The researcher position identifies how
the credibility of a study is supported (Caelli et al., 2003). I employed my stance to guide and
ground the debate. I further believe that individual needs in workers are dynamic; and that
priority of individual needs change.
It was therefore important to launch this study with the recognition that reporting is a
sensitive topic, both to corporations and workers. Multiple efforts to acquire permissions and
access to near miss historical data from three organizations were unsuccessful. The idea was that
studying near miss data will inform practice, not only regarding the types of incidents that occur,
but it will also present opportunities for deeper understanding about circumstances surrounding
incident occurrence. Studying near miss incidents required a sampling method that was least
intrusive yet capable of extracting valuable incident data. The study incorporated a
nonexperimental general qualitative design. The data were collected from a sample size of seven
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participants. The criteria to participate was that participants must have had prior experience
working in either aircraft maintenance or petrochemical operations, must not have been presently
working in either industry, and must have been recently removed from working in either industry
within the last five years. No minimum length of experience was required.
The sample did not include present workers. The sample was bound by a limited
population. Care was taken in limiting the parameters of participants to workers removed from
either industry within five years. The snowball sampling technique was used to recruit
participants because it is applied to populations in which access to participants is challenging,
but where networking is employed in the recruitment of participants for the study (Sadler, Lee,
Lim, & Fullerton, 2010).
Snowball sampling was used to recruit eight participants, and seven participants were
interviewed. One recommended recruit, who initially agreed to participate, did not return the
mailed consent form to agree to the interview. Further efforts to contact the recruit were
unsuccessful. No pseudonym was assigned, and the potential interview would have represented
a craft with experience in the petrochemical industry.
The sampling instrument was individual telephone interviews. Three key experts were
used to recruit potential participants. The population eligibility will potentially decrease as the
number of participants increases (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). The snowball sampling
technique is developed by gaining recommended participants through knowledgeable sources
(Creswell, 2007). The snowball strategy was adopted in a deliberate effort to use insiders who
knew of workers recently removed from the industry. The next section describes the research
design.
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The particulars of the research design are explained and the sampling technique to recruit
participants is discussed. A table of the sample demographics is displayed and a description of
the participants follows. The method of data collection is explained. Next, the sampling
procedure is described. The concept of the Type-X event within the interview protocol is
explained to frame and establish the limitations of the near miss definition. The method of
coding the data is explained. Lastly, the particulars of the interview protocol are stated, followed
by descriptions of Data Analysis, Trustworthiness and Generalizability, the Researcher
Perspective, Participant Critiques of Validity, and the Limitations of the Study. Demographics
and the method of coding the data are explained following the presentation of the study
particulars.
Design of the Research
This near miss reporting study used a nonexperimental general qualitative design. The
data were collected from a sample size of seven participants. The criteria to participate were that
participants must have had prior experience working in either aircraft maintenance or
petrochemical operations, must not have been presently working in either industry, and must
have been recently removed from working in either industry within the last five years. No
minimum length of experience was required. The sample did not include present workers, and
the requirements of the sample were bound by a limited population.
The snowball sampling method was used to recruit participants who fit specific criteria,
and each participant fit the criteria to participate in the study. Communication and contact with
participants was via telephone, e-mail, and the U.S. Postal Service. Seven participants
represented a field of three refinery and four aircraft maintenance crafts with 176 total years of
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industry experience. Time away from the industry ranged from between one month to five years.
A description of the sample is represented in Table 3. A pseudonym was assigned to each
participant upon recruitment, and the participants are listed according to the order in which the
interviews were conducted.

Table 3
Demographics of the Near Miss Reporting Sample
Aircraft/Petrochemical Craft
Industry Type

Years
Worked

Years/Months Away
from Industry

S1

Petrochemical

Refinery Operator

08

4 Years

S3

Petrochemical

Refinery Process
Supervision

25

< 1 Month

S2

Aircraft

Maintenance Supervision

30

2 Years, 10 Months

S4

Petrochemical

Refinery Operator

25

3 Years

S5

Aircraft

Maintenance Supervision

35

5 Years

S6

Aircraft

Maintenance

31

7 Months

S7

Petrochemical

Refinery
Operations/Maintenance

22

9 Months

S1 through S7 represent the participants in the order interviews were conducted. The
demographics represent three participants with experience in aircraft maintenance and four
participants with experience in refinery operations crafts. More than 176 years of combined
working experience are represented amongst participants. Participants most recently worked in
either industry from between less than one month to five years.
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Description of Participants
One participant group of adults (19 years or older) was interviewed. The participants
previously worked in, but no longer, either aircraft ground operations or petrochemical
operations within the last five years, due to retirement or change of career—aircraft mechanics,
pipefitters, and operators are some examples of trade types represented by both industries.
Working environments for workers included refineries, chemical plants, and aircraft
installations. The recruitment method was snowball sampling. My experience in industry
includes years of experience in aircraft maintenance and refinery operations; I knew of two
candidates who retired from each industry. I contacted three known recruiters to ask them to
recommend participants who fit the criteria. Once contact was made, I asked known participants
to recommend other participants to take part in the study. It was anticipated that the known
candidates were sources of knowledge about the population of workers who previously worked
in industry and were now removed from either industry within five years.
The interview protocol incorporated validity by referencing the Type-X definition. The
Type-X definition was the term assigned to the participants’ description of a near miss event in
which no injury or damage to equipment or the environment occurred. The Type-X event
established a form of validity that was built into the interview protocol, and also established near
miss definition parameters for participants. Accuracy in evaluating and learning what
participants mean reflects traits of qualitative studies (Creswell & Miller, 2000).
One-on-one individual telephone interviews were used as the sampling instrument.
Telephone interviews were convenient because of the extended distances amongst participants’
locations. The locations of participants ranged across three states and one U.S. territory. The
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telephone interview supports communication with participants when accessibility is a challenge
(Creswell, 2007). By design, the interview questions were open-ended. Open-ended questions
promote expression and hearing what participants have to say (Creswell, 2007). The parameter
of the sample was six to eight participants. Saturation of the sample was approached when a
representative number of participants was interviewed from each industry. Data collection was
terminated after the seventh interview was completed.
Sampling Procedure
Once a recruit was referred, I contacted the recruit via email or telephone to establish
contact and to screen for eligibility. After verifying eligibility parameters, I requested a street
address to mail out the consent form (see Appendix A). I assigned the pseudonyms S1 through
S8 to each contact in the order of recruitment. When the signed consent form was received via
U.S. Post Office delivery, I again contacted the prospective participants to set an interview date
and time. Communication between individual participants and me was via telephone and e-mail.
The telephone mode of communication was selected based on convenience, privacy, and
distance. Participants resided across three U.S. states and one U.S. territory.
Given the variation in physical distances between participants and the researcher, a plan
to use video conference or telephone to conduct the individual interviews was both practical and
convenient, and required a single, reliable mobile device for connectivity. Video conferencing is
a more technologically advanced mode of communication, but telephone was more convenient
because of the ease of connectivity across distances. Eight recruits were contacted, and eight
consent forms were mailed out. Seven forms were received, and seven individual telephone
interviews were conducted.
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The Type-X Incident Event
By design, the description of a Type-X event was incorporated into the study to establish
consistency in meaning of the near miss definition. Participants were asked to describe an event
in which no injury or damage to equipment or the environment occurred. In the effort to
describe Type-X events, participants demonstrated that reflection was required to separate
experiences that were not Type-X. Participants were asked to describe personal experiences with
Type-X events.
The design of the interview incorporated constant review of participant descriptions to
manage clarification in meaning throughout. The Type-X events participants described
established a consistent reference used to represent the near miss event. Participants were asked
to reference the Type-X event throughout the remainder of the interview. The Type-X event
represented an individual participant’s example of a near miss.
Coding the Data
A general inductive approach was used to code the data. Meaning is derived from the
data through inductive data analysis and originates from within the participants themselves
(Creswell, 2007). The themes developed from within three major categories: (a) Hazards that
existed within the work environment, (b) Processes of work (the “what”), and (c) Practices or
actions (the “how”). The major themes developed throughout the process of reviewing multiple
audio recordings and readings of the interview transcripts and written notes.
The data were coded by transcribing audio recordings into a written document by hand.
The transcriptions developed from multiple re-plays of the audio recordings. The first audio replay was for understanding. In subsequent re-plays, clarity of meaning developed along with
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common themes. Multiple re-plays of audio enhanced inflections of tone, speed, and candor that
conveyed clarity in context and meaning and inspired themes during transcription. The
descriptive coding process was used to begin the initial process of coding data. The descriptive
coding process represents a pass used early in the coding cycle in which words or phrasing are
used to summarize meaning from a section of text data (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014).
Subsequent passes of coding produced broader, dynamic themes acquired through the process of
induction. When compared to hand transcriptions of audio recordings, electronic transcriptions
generated from software require more time to gain familiarity with the software, but generate an
abundance of themes (Basit, 2003). More than six hours of interview audio recordings were
transcribed in the near miss study.
In the near miss reporting study, themes emerged in an integrated fashion, such that
sometimes one theme overlapped another based on the experiences and ideas that participants
presented. Collectively, the data were examined within the context of the three categories within
which the major themes emerged. The data emerged from participant descriptions within the
context of customary work. The data and findings of the study are presented throughout the
remainder of the chapter. The findings are organized by examining the data in context to answer
each of four key research questions.
Interview Protocol
The interview protocol was designed to collect data about the experiences of workers
within two industrial work environments. The source of data collection was seven participants
from the target population. Each interview was audio-recorded. A semi-structured design was
utilized to engage participants in a conversation that required reflection and elaboration on
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personal experiences and observations in work environments. Individual open-ended interviews
were used to capture the unique contexts of experiences. Participants were former adult workers
in aircraft ground and the petrochemical operations who are 19 years and older.
The near miss study was designed to be anonymous because the topic could be sensitive
to participants, and anonymity may have minimized undue harm. After a recruited participant
responded by returning a signed consent form via U.S. postal service, I emailed or telephoned the
potential participants to set a date and time for the telephone interview. During the interview, I
continuously checked for consistency in meaning. For example, although participants agreed
that all incidents should be reported, participants classified near miss events in terms of severity
to determine what events should be reported.
I continually reminded participants to not describe incidents in which injury or damage to
equipment or the environment occurred. I asked interview questions according to the interview
protocol listed in Appendix B. I asked probing questions to follow up on responses when clarity
was needed, and when elaboration created potential to lead to deeper understanding. I
transcribed each interview by hand. I used codes to develop themes and draw inferences about
worker responses from the descriptions to answer the four key questions.
Key question one. In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical
operations describe hazards of the work environment?
Key question two. How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground
operations and petrochemical operations?
Key question three. How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?
Key question four. In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the
OSHA goals of identifying hazards and preventing the recurrence of an incident?
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The interview began with opening statements that described the purpose of the study.
The questions were arranged in four sections. The conversation began with a discussion about
hazard identification and progressed into knowledge about incidents. The questions were
designed for participants to describe an incident that framed the definition of a near miss or close
call. The parameters were that the incident did not result in injury or damage to equipment or the
environment.
I exercised care to ensure that the participants’ definition of an incident was then used
throughout the remainder of the conversation. For example, following a discussion about
incident identification, I stated, “Okay, in order to distinguish between your definition of an
incident and an accident, let’s refer to your definition as a Type-X event.” The purpose of this
approach was to empower the participants by validating input and encouraging participation.
Additionally, reference to a specific type of event established the parameter of an incident in
which no injury or damage to equipment or the environment occurred. Collected data were
stored on a secure database, and the data are retained for three years after the study is completed
and securely destroyed after the three-year period.
Data Analysis
Interview data were transcribed manually from audio recordings and analyzed for
emerging themes that developed directly from the data. A digital recording device was utilized
to record the telephone interviews. The device had variable playback speeds used to pace the
audio playback. I printed each transcript and listened and re-read the transcript multiple times.
On the first read, I made phrasing notations in the margins. After completing the initial read
process for each transcript, I listed key phrases in the margins. The themes were further refined
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and classified into a manageable number of themes. Some themes overlapped. An indication of
saturation is that themes become repetitive (Baralt, 2012). At the point of saturation, I checked
the categories and determined whether adjustments to the sizes of categories were warranted.
During the coding of the descriptive data, an inductive approach was used to gather
meaning from the descriptions. A general inductive approach to analysis results in the
construction of themes that represent a connection amongst categories that emerge from the data
(Thomas, 2006). The interview data were gathered from a representative sample of the target
population. Categories of hazards that emerged from the data were developed, and similarities
and differences amongst the hazards and across industries were identified. The quoted
descriptions from participants were stated to support each category theme, and the statements
that the participants described were presented and analyzed for directly stated descriptions and
implicit meanings.
Collectively, the data measured worker perceptions of hazards identification and
perceptions of incident reporting. A coding scheme was established to build themes from the
experiences that workers described. The themes inform practice about how workers interpret the
goal of near miss reporting. I accomplish clarity in meaning by including context statements for
each direct quote. The results of the data analysis are presented with clarity and objectivity and
used to draw conclusions about the four research questions.
Trustworthiness and Generalizability
The credibility of the study was established by justifying the data gathered. Two industry
populations were used to establish commonalities and differences in workplace hazards and
knowledge of incidents. I was mindful that the descriptions participants provided during the
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interview occurred in different contexts. The data from workers in two workplace environments
are not sufficiently generalizable to other aviation ground and petrochemical environments,
given the sample size of seven participants.
To ensure that implicit meaning be retained in the observations and experiences the
participants described, two elements of trustworthiness were applied to the findings. I utilized
the Lincoln and Guba (1985) model of trustworthiness to establish validity through credibility,
which applies the four principles of credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability
to gauge consistency and truthfulness in the analysis of qualitative results. A measure of
establishing assurance is to apply the researcher lens to determine when a saturation of themes is
approached (Creswell & Miller, 2000).
Using data from two industries fulfilled two purposes. First, the data from one industry
was compared to that of another industry to triangulate findings across industries. Secondly, the
results of the study were compared with findings of studies with similar purpose. Two methods
of establishing trustworthiness are to compare similar studies and to check for consistency in
coding (Thomas, 2006). The individual interview method was used to provide opportunities for
participants to be more descriptive of hazards and incident knowledge.
The Researcher Perspective
My frame of reference for the near miss study assumes that both the worker and the
organization share the common goal to identify workplace hazards and prevent the recurrence of
an incident event. I believe the reality of near miss reporting is understood by learning from
those for whom the process was developed. My academic background is rooted in Industrial
Technology. In my experience in aircraft maintenance and refinery process operations, the
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perceived message from the organization is “Don’t get hurt.” Depending on the worker
experience, the message is interpreted in different ways, considering diversity in backgrounds
and working experience. The level of formality the organization communicates is enough to
establish a reputation in practicing safe work and in reporting incidents. The fact that incidents
recur indicates that new hazards are identified or that old hazards are pervasive.
I adopted the interpretivist frame of reference to establish validity through three lenses
described by Creswell and Miller (2000). The interpretivist paradigm relies on the context in
which the inquiry occurs, and the constructs of interpretations are based upon the input data from
the stakeholders and the viewpoint of the researcher (Creswell & Miller, 2000). I believe both
the worker and the organization want to avoid injuries. As such, it makes sense to assume that
safe work is in the best interest of each, but the prevalence of injuries over time indicates an
adopted level of tolerance. The problem with acceptance through time is that industrial
processes are not independent. The benefits of safe work practices are intangible. More directly,
perspectives are shaped by experiences in the field and through communication with the
organization. In other words, workers corroborate the reality of established processes in context.
My position aligns with a philosophy that seeks to understand and translate the
experiences of the participants as described. The selection of the validation strategy was based
on the interpretivist paradigm. The knowledge built from the study was constructed from the
truths that emerged during the process. The views of the researcher, the participants, and the
readers were used to build and establish research lenses, and the lenses direct the type of validity
procedure to be applied to build credibility in the study (Creswell & Miller, 2000). The study
methodology was examined to defend the integrity of the study process and findings. I ensured
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that the pool of participants was qualified to discuss the topic of near miss incident reporting;
each participant had experiences with near miss events.
To establish credibility, I was mindful of how the conclusions of the study are supported.
For example, I demonstrated that the findings on near miss incident reporting are based on truths
and are represented by supporting evidence that exhibit logic. I used a consistent method of
categorizing data to organize the analysis and present the results. I also applied consistency in a
logical emergence of the analysis to develop the findings and conclusions.
Incident reporting data were triangulated by applying the researcher lens, which utilized
multiple sources and methods of data convergence to validate results (Creswell & Miller, 2000).
The source of the data was the study participants. I compared data from workers in aircraft
ground operations against data from workers in the petrochemical process industry. The
interview tool was used in identifying the types of hazards across the two selected industries and
produced a baseline of incident knowledge.
Participant Critiques of Validity
I applied a second lens as a procedure to maintain accuracy in reporting the data
participants described. Participants were used as the frame of reference by which I inform
practice. I applied assessment of accuracy in interpreting the findings. Participants were asked
to describe characteristics of incidents that were previously self-defined and interpreted as near
miss events by said participants. For example, I asked participants: “How would you define an
incident that almost resulted in an accident? Let’s refer to your definition as a Type-X event. I
will reference your definition in subsequent questions.”
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As the inquiry continued, I applied the self-declared definition of the incident event the
participants referenced to identify characteristics that defined and clarified the definition.
Throughout the interview, I asked participants to confirm, compare, and contrast elements
related to a targeted event described as a near miss event. I applied probing questions that
engaged the participants to clarify references to described experiences. Member checking
procedures promote accuracy in interpretation by confirming the perspectives of the participant
(Jackson, Drummond, & Camara, 2007).
Limitations of the Study
A key limitation of the study was that recruiters could have excluded some participants
by limiting the selection of workers asked to participate. The limitation may have excluded the
voices of some potential participants. The nonrandom sample applied to the snowball technique
may not have been representative of the population, and gatekeepers can impede progress (Starks
& Trinidad, 2007).
To the extent that workers were asked to recall and describe hazards and incidents, the
study did not include opportunities for participants to identify alternative channels of hazard
acknowledgement. For example, workers may have encountered and identified workplace
hazards and may or may not have utilized alternative actions to eliminate workplace hazards
encountered. The study did not provide opportunities for workers to describe alternative
methods employed in mitigating hazards when hazards are identified.
The near miss reporting study utilized a nonrandom sample technique to recruit
participants to participate. The snowball sampling method was used to refer other potential
participants because of the specific definition of the population. The snowball sampling method
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is applicable to hard-to-reach populations, and a network is applied in recruiting participants
(Sadler et al., 2010).
The key challenge to applying the snowball sample method in the near miss study was
recruiting, as the population of participants who fit the criteria to participate was a limitation.
Sometimes, multiple contacts to follow up were required. Sometimes, potential participants
decided not to participate after all. Sometimes, potential participants did not fit the criteria. The
limitation of verifying eligibility was averted by the small sample size, the diversity of the twoindustry participation, and the network of available recruits. The number of participants can
pose a challenge to verification as the sample size grows further from the recruits (Biernacki &
Waldorf, 1981). A key limitation of the near miss study is that the data captured experiences
over a period in time. Hazards or work processes introduced to the workplace today are not
represented in the study. Finally, workers may not be inclined to tell the full story when
recalling incidents. This study focused on incident events related to personal safety.
Participants may have experienced feelings of vulnerability and may have perceived
interview conversations as negative. The descriptions and definitions of incidents determined to
be worthy of reporting were determined by the population of participants. Further, participants
may have considered the implications of how interview conversations may affect future job
opportunities. To overcome the limitation, the sample of participants could have been more
representative of the population.
Summary
In summary, this chapter presented the methodology of the near miss study. The
approach to inquiry, the description of participants, and the interview procedure were described.
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The challenges to acquire data were described in terms of developing the study design. The
inquiry approach was described in terms of the snowball sampling method to recruit and reach
the specific population of former workers. The approach to data analysis was discussed along
with the critiques of participants and external readers. Considerations of validity were discussed.
Finally, the limitations of the study were identified. The findings of the study are examined in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

The findings of the study are presented in this chapter. Individual worker experiences
with incident events in aircraft maintenance operations and petrochemical operations are
analyzed. The purpose of the inquiry was to understand how four characteristics of near miss
incident events were interpreted amongst workers: (a) How hazards were described, (b) How a
near miss incident event was defined, (c) The goal of reporting near miss incidents, and (d) The
relationship between reporting incidents and the OSHA goal of identifying hazards and
preventing incident recurrence. The four characteristics established four key research questions.
Key question one. In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical
operations describe hazards of the work environment?
Key question two. How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground
operations and petrochemical operations?
Key question three. How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?
Key question four. In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the
OSHA goals of identifying hazards and preventing the recurrence of an incident?
Chapter 4 is organized into sections in which each key research question is examined.
The data and the findings for each question are presented within the same section. The hazards
that participants described are analyzed to answer Key Question One. The definition of a near
miss incident event is interpreted through descriptions of Type-X events to answer Key Question
Two. The goal of reporting an incident is explained to answer Key Question Three. The goal of
reporting is then transposed to evaluate the stated goal for alignment with the OSHA goal and to
answer Key Question Four. The goal of reporting is examined through the lens of motivation to
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take action when an incident occurs and through the Process Practice Purpose principle. Finally,
a summary of the content is presented at the end of the chapter.
How a Hazard is Described: Key Question One
In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical operations
describe hazards of the work environment?
The hazards that workers encountered are examined in this section to answer Key
Question One. Data about the hazards, the process to do work (the “what”), and work practices
(the “how”) are used to answer Key Question One. The practice of performing work and the
processes used to do the job were central constructs necessary to frame and present the findings
within the work environment context because near miss incident events occurred in the process
of doing work and in the presence of hazards.
The central focus of organizing the findings was to present the descriptive stories of near
miss events within the natural work settings amidst the work activities and existing hazards.
Figure 5 illustrates the context in which the major themes originated in terms of what was done
and how work was done amidst existing hazards.

Figure 5. A representation of the context in which major themes emerged.
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The hazards that participants described were categorized into three types: (a) Physical,
(b) Chemical, and (c) Hazards that exist in the surrounding work environment. Other hazards
were associated with the capacity to perform work but were not directly acquired from within
workplace settings. Some hazards were common to both workplace types, while other hazards
were specified. For example, stress was explicitly stated by petrochemical participants and
implied by participants in aircraft maintenance. Participants were able to identify and describe
hazards with minimal effort, indicating a measure of familiarity with and knowledge about
visible and invisible worksite hazards.
Over time, knowledge about hazards developed alongside experience and training. The
advancement of knowledge progressed through time, training, and experience. Hazards were
mitigated through both formal established practices and informal methods. Each of the three
hazard categories identified—Physical, Chemical, and Hazards that exist in the surrounding
work environment—are examined in the sections that follow.
Workers are vulnerable to hazards when unforeseen and unrecognized potential exists
within workspaces where multiple jobs are in progress. Multiple job activities in progress mean
that workers are susceptible to unforeseen hazards by virtue of being in the surrounding work
environment. Hazards in the surrounding work environment (HaSE) are recognized through
training, mentorship, and experience.
Beyond the recognizable physical and chemical hazards, HaSE mean that workers new to
the environment may be susceptible to the potential of unforeseen job activities that may shift
over time when multiple jobs are in progress within the same workspace. Examples of such
potential include poor communication and coordination amongst work crews, or under-
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development of the skill to recognize how sudden changes in environmental conditions such as
wind shifts impact the work task. Other examples include insufficient knowledge and training
about hazards that develop in the absence of developing routines to follow procedures such as
isolation and lockout tagout of hazardous energy sources.
Physical Hazards
Physical hazards that were recognized signaled an alert to personal safety. The alert was
acknowledged in either of two ways: with an action to mitigate the hazard or a response to take
no action. When physical hazards were acknowledged, the interpretation and call to action that
resulted were as varied as the workers. Participants described hazards associated with both work
environments. Some hazards were more visible than others. Participants’ descriptions of
housekeeping, fatigue, stress, the commute to work, and the density of jobs within the workspace
are examined as physical hazards in the next section.
Housekeeping. Participants identified poor housekeeping practices as a prominent
physical hazard. For example, actions to mitigate housekeeping hazards were applied when the
value of housekeeping practices was recognized, implying that in the alternative, housekeeping
deficiencies were either unrecognized or the decision to act was waived. Participants recognized
that good housekeeping practices support hazard mitigation by removing obstructions that are
unexpectedly encountered in work areas. The value of housekeeping is practices described in
Table 4.
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Table 4
Housekeeping Principles and Hazard Identification
Aircraft Maintenance
Petrochemical Operations
It’s the individual. How much care do
you take to make sure that you remove
all hazards. We have grease rags and
stuff. “Did you put it in certain
barrels?” “Nah, I’m not gonna’ do that.
I’ll put it in the trash.” That’s not right
to the individual that knows rags should,
no matter what it is, should go in a
barrel. And it’s a hazard. And don’t put
it in the trash. [S7]

In the areas that you work, whenever you have
steam, the water goes on the ground, or if it isn’t
routed to the sewer or something, that hot water,
algae builds so fast, grows so fast on those
puddles. So, you can just keep walking over it
every day, and before you know it, someone is
gonna’ slip. Housekeeping is so big. [S6]

Participants recognized value in maintaining workspaces free of obstructions. When
obstacles to good housekeeping were recognized as hazards, participants decided to act or
take no action to mitigate the hazards.

Fatigue, stress, and the commute. Fatigue was common to both work environments.
Component parts of fatigue include the demands of shiftwork: 12- and 16-hour work shifts and
changing shift periods associated with shiftwork design, overtime, and shift trades. Fatigue was
extended by the commuting distances to and from work. In the process of doing work, the
volume of workers was bounded by shared and congested workspaces. Participants also
expressed a heightened awareness about the influence of fatigue and long commutes on safe
work practices.
Although not directly described by participants in aircraft maintenance, stress was
implied through descriptions of near miss experiences. An example of implied stress, as
described by one participant, was knowing the ramifications of leaving a tool on an airplane and
catching the error before launch. Participants in petrochemical operations explicitly described
experiences of stress. One participant expressed that, after a week of work, the transition to days
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off was akin to post-traumatic stress. Participants’ descriptions of fatigue, stress, and commuting
are identified in Table 5.

Table 5
Fatigue, Stress, and the Commute as Physical Hazards
Aircraft Maintenance
Petrochemical Operations
They used to put your picture on the wall
when a guy had died. They'd put it over the
time clock. You come in and then you see
the picture. I came in and I saw his picture
on the wall, and I knew he died, by just the
picture being there. And the first thing I said
to someone, “Did he fall asleep?” That
commute was one of the toughest things for
me, was going home at night, and I was
falling asleep. I had common sense enough
to stop on the side and take a nap. Yeah, that
problem, it was one of the biggest hazards. I
find that it was easier for me to work 16
hours on Days, on Swing Shift, than it was
for me to work 8 hours on Midnights. You
try to avoid being the one responsible
because you're sleepy or something. In some
ways, you protect yourself and the people
around you. Or, if you have to do something
that could cause harm, you grab someone,
and you have them assist you, or you give
them direction in any way. [S7]

Sometimes you're doing longer shifts than
normal, coming in on your days off. A lot of
people have long commutes. My commute
was over an hour drive back and forth, so a
12-hour shift was more like a 14-hour shift
for me, and even longer if I'm stuck in traffic.
Some of the hazards of the job are being
exposed to hydrocarbons, potentially
carcinogens. There is a risk of fire, gas leaks,
fuels, fatigue, stress. There is also loud noise,
so that you gotta’, some places require double
hearing protection in certain areas. [S1]
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(Table 5 Continued)
Aircraft Maintenance
I’ve been exposed to quite a few near misses.
From that whole spectrum that I pointed out
earlier, from leaving a tool on an airplane if
you hadn’t run up and catch. [S2]

Petrochemical Operations
Normal process hazards in the refinery were,
like I said, heat and you know, just that stress,
the level of stress that you get working around
that kind of stuff. And then as a management
person, it, you get out of some of the physical
hazards and you get more into the, the stress
level is tremendous. And one of the things
that I worry about the most was somebody
getting hurt. When nobody got hurt? I think
you get this almost post-traumatic stress thing
every time you get your days off, where, you
just, you know, you’ve been living on the
edge of all this pressure, and then, all of a
sudden, you’re off, and it’s a real low.
You’re on a high and then you go to a low
and it’s kind of a shocking physical thing.
[S3]

Participants identified that working shiftwork, working extended shifts, and commuting long
distances contributed to fatigue. Participants who were supervisors described stress in
explicit and implicit terms. Participants described hazards in association with past
experiences within and outside of the workspace.

Multiple jobs within the workspace. Multiple jobs were active at the same time within
limited areas. Participants referred to past events and experiences within crowded spaces to
illustrate and explain the parameters of a near miss. Participants described hidden hazards based
on prior experiences in the workspaces, and participants developed a level of hazard awareness
consistent with experience. The described experiences combined to compose each individual
participant Type-X event and define a near miss.
Participants acknowledged learning from experiences with hazards when multiple people
were working in the same workspace. Exposure to live and active systems while working the job
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created hidden hazards in shared workspaces where lockout tagout procedures were not used.
Both visible and invisible physical hazards were active, such that conditions were subject to
change. Participants cited awareness of the surroundings, timing and chance, and lockout tagout
procedures as precursors of injury. Participants’ descriptions of hazard awareness and learning
within shared workspaces are described in Table 6.

Table 6
Hazard Awareness of Visible and Invisible Hazards in Shared Workspaces
Aircraft Maintenance
Petrochemical Operations
You got some cross-utilization issues where
you could be putting somebody at risk
unknowingly, and your actions can actually
hurt somebody else and somebody else’s
actions can actually hurt you because you’re
not 100% aware of what everybody else is
doing. [S2]
A sheetmetal technician that was working on
the [landing gear] door, and they were
running hydraulic systems, and they had
cleared everyone, except this individual
thought it would’ve been fine for you to be in
that situation, and he was inside. He was
laying in the door itself. That day, there was
a certain situation that wasn’t looked at, and
luckily, the individual was okay since there
was enough, enough space between the
aircraft fuselage and the door, if the door
came up. I was actually involved in bringing
the door back down by attaching a hand pump
to the brake to release the brakes that the
doors will still come down, and the individual
came out of there. [S5]

Also, we do a lot of work with our hands,
and you have to be, especially when you’re
working with another person? You have to
be aware, you know, if you’ve got a 4-pound
mallet, and you’re going to hit, say, we call
‘em wedges? And you just have to make
sure that both you guys are on the same page,
that if he’s gonna’ be swinging the mallet
and you’re gonna’ be trying to hold the blind
or hold the striking wrench, you use the right
equipment? You have to just be really
aware. You can’t be asleep, you know, at
3:30 in the morning, trying to do this kinda’
work. You have to be fully focused or else
someone gets hurt. It happens way too
much, you know? [S6]
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(Table 6 Continued)
And the ground person that was on the ground
in that particular area gave the okay to bring
the hydraulic system up, knowing that this
individual was working, and they assumed
that the safety precaution was taken, that the
door will bring up and down. But knowing
that, they bypassed one little safety procedure
that wasn’t done. From then on, to ensure
that that particular Cannon plug was removed
and tagged with the warning tag, so such an
incident will not repeat. [S5]

When I think about the near misses I was
personally involved in, the only thing that
made the difference was time. If somebody
had dropped something 2 seconds later?
There would have been a serious injury. So,
I mean, honestly, it’s just timing. You have
to have everything lined up just right. And if
something’s not lined up, if someone’s not
standing in the wrong place at the wrong
time, then the injury doesn’t occur. So, yeah,
it’s not an engineered event, there’s a lotta’
chance to it. [S3]

Participants demonstrated keen knowledge, awareness, and coordination associated with
learning about hazards when multiple people were working in the same workspace.
Participants described exposure to active systems without positive shutoff lockout tagout that
created hidden hazards in shared workspaces.

A Type-X event is the term introduced during the one-on-one individual interviews and
used to describe an incident that almost resulted in an accident. As recollection of hazards
developed, participants were reminded to not describe incidents that resulted in injury or damage
to equipment or the environment. The chemical hazards that participants described are examined
next.
Chemical Hazards
The second prevalent hazard type that participants described was the chemical hazard.
Chemicals in use were likely to burn, cause fire, or inflict injury to eyes, hands, and respiratory
systems. Knowledge about the potential for injury was acquired through experience, training,
and a regard for personal safety. Participants were knowledgeable about the sources and use of
chemical safety facts, as well as how to apply knowledge to the job function. Participants acted
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purposefully to mitigate chemical hazards. Participants described change in exposure to
chemical agents over time. Personal agency and managing chemical hazard exposure over time
are examined in the sections that follow.
Purposeful actions against chemical hazards. In response to mitigating chemical
hazards, participants demonstrated personal agency to take action to prevent personal injury.
Participants utilized chemical safety data from Safety Data Sheets, donned personal protective
equipment, and referenced past experiences as personal safety safeguards while working in
chemical hazard environments. Participants regarded the decision to act to mitigate chemical
hazards as a matter of individual regard for personal safety. Characteristics of personal agency
and reflection on past experiences associated with chemical hazard potential are identified in
Table 7.
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Table 7
Personal Agency to Take Action in Chemical Hazard Environments
Aircraft Maintenance
Petrochemical Operations
A lot of the times, experience counts. If you
never see something happen, you can’t make
a decision. And plus, attitude. A big thing is
your MSDS, your material database. It’ll tell
you, “This material will cause breathing
problems” or “You don’t want to walk on it.”
So, it is good to know what material you’re
dealing with. [S7]

A bleeder valve was left open, and in a quick
ditch effort attempt to shut it and stop it,
jumped into the ditch area and shut the valve
off real quick. They were able to basically
divert an explosion or major gas leak that
could have resulted in a catastrophic failure.
Fortunately, nothing happened to them and
they were able to get the valve closed, but it
could have been a very disastrous incident. I
was standing pretty close to everything that
had happened. Had that guy not have gotten
that valve closed in time, that probably could
have directly affected me. I think your own
personality plays a role in that too. Are you
the type that is going to react and jump into
that ditch at the time to try and shut that off?
Are you the type of person that’s just going to
run and maybe, call for help? [S1]

Worked with a lot of hazardous fluids and
hazardous materials like grease and
hydraulic fluid, fuel, engine oil, and of
course, a lot of high intensity sound, noise.
And as far as other protection goes, working
with hydraulics or safety wire or anything
that’s gonna’ fly into my face or my ear or
my eyes, I would wear goggles, and
sometimes goggles with face shield, which
were required. Or, I’ll wear it for my own
protection, regardless. I thought that it was
for my own personal benefit. [S5]

I can think of numerous times when there was
a process variable going on, and if it hadn’t
been corrected, it would have resulted in
potential injury or equipment damage, and for
the fact that there’s an operator there who
sees something happening and then stops it?
That’s the difference, and that’s why we’re
there, really. [S3]

Participants were knowledgeable about chemical hazards that compromise respiratory
systems and have potential for catastrophic effects on personal safety and equipment.
Participants demonstrated personal agency to act to reduce exposure. Participants also
respected the production process and systems such as hydraulics for the potential to injure or
cause damage.
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Change in exposure to chemical hazards over time. Participants identified
observations about chemical hazards over time. The practice of how work was done in the
presence of chemicals and perceptions about the hazards that chemicals presented have changed.
For example, based on increased personal awareness and experience, chemical process lines
represented newly recognized potential for spontaneous leak and line rupture conditions.
Participants evaluated change by reflecting on past experiences in comparison to more recent
practices. Milestones in incorporating the use of engineering controls and in wearing personal
protective equipment were recognized as safeguards that were implemented over time.
Participants recognized changes in attitudes toward process safety. Table 8 describes participant
perceptions of exposure to chemical hazards.
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Table 8
Change in Perceptions of Exposure to Chemicals Over Time
Aircraft Maintenance
Petrochemical Operations
I remember back in the days, we never had
hydraulic recycle, and that was not a good
thing, and over the years, we’ve been asked
to contain them. They have modified the
equipment so certain incidents won’t happen.
If it was hazardous material, they’ve come
up with a better way to contain them. Every
time we did work, we always clean as we go
so the hydraulic fluid doesn’t spread
elsewhere. Try to contain it with proper
containment, whether it be a drip pan. Use a
drip pan so it doesn’t get into the dirt or
concrete or bucket, plastic bags, use of
absorbent materials. That’s one of the huge
experiences in my years that I’ve seen, just
with that one hazardous material. [S5]
Or, you're around a pneumatic system that is
powering the air conditioner and you're
looking for a leak, and you put yourself in a
position where you can get burned by
leaking air or being in the area where there's
any kind of explosives, ruptures, any of the
piping, you can get hurt. You also got risk
with hydraulics, ‘cause hydraulics have high
pressure fluids that are being pushed through
hydraulic lines, and most of those types of
issues that you’re looking for leaks, and if
it’s in a line, the leak can spray with a lot of
force in a very small stream. It can puncture
your skin and inject you. [S2]

You use a lotta’ chemicals. And there were
smells. There’re some chemicals you can’t
detect. You can’t, so you have to protect
yourself by using protective gear before you
even enter the area. [S4]
When I was an operator, more immediate
hazards were chemical. When you compare
the hazards and the Type-X incidents when I
first started in the 90s? Compared to the way
it was when I left? The entire industry is so
much safer, it’s incredible. The kind of
incidents that routinely went on, and the
attitudes about how to behave during the
incidents? It’s drastically different now.
And it’s so much safer, it’s incredible. I’d
seen so much. We haven’t had the level of
hazard. In the old days, there was a couple
times a week there’d be something major
happened, and now? Maybe a couple times a
year, something that I would consider major
happened. So, it’s definitely improved, and I
don’t think you can argue with that. It’s
definitely safer than it used to be. [S3]
And of course, a lot of dangerous chemicals,
especially H2S, hydrogen sulfide. Probably
the main hazard out there is when a pump
seal would rupture. That’s the most
prevalent problems that we find in the
refinery. You have to catch it when it first
starts. That was pretty much my job, to walk
around, look at equipment, find these little
problems in their initial stages. [S6]

Participants chronicled change in managing exposure to potential chemical release
conditions over time. Participants recognized milestones in engineering controls, personal
protective equipment safeguards, and attitudes toward process safety, and protecting the
environment against chemical releases.
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Hazards in the Surrounding Work Environment (HaSE)
The third and final classification of hazard that participants described existed within the
surrounding work environment. Job activities were changing and shifting relative to the
workspace, and participants acted to mitigate potential incidents. The activities that occurred
within the workspace presented potential consequences for everyone. After near miss events
occurred, safety precautions and new procedures were adopted. Participants described hazards in
terms of relationship to the potential for incidents to occur. They also explained how new hires
must be trained to develop routines related to isolating hazardous energy and how experience,
training, and mentorship are related. Participants then explained that experience is an element of
hazard recognition.
Inadequate training and mentorship to identify HaSE. Participants identified training
and mentorship amongst the hazards related to incidents. Participants recognized that new hires
must be trained and mentored in developing routines to verify hazard isolation. Participants in
aircraft maintenance who were mentors recognized the value of training new hires to develop the
principle of following procedures to the letter and following lockout tagout of hazardous
electrical energy.
Participants in petrochemical operations recognized through early experiences that
experience is a necessary component of mentorship; job qualification by itself does not equate to
experience, and mentorship requires experience. Participants explained that mentorship extends
beyond qualification. Attributes of mentorship and training about hazards are described in Table
9.
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Table 9
Inadequate Training and Mentorship to I.D. Hazards
Aircraft Maintenance
Petrochemical Operations
We always would take the time and make
sure that they [new hires] know all the safety
hazards. Number one is that you print out the
procedure. You go from top to bottom, and
all the safety features. Did you pull that
circuit breaker? Did you do this? The first
time, before you start. And sometimes, it’s
pulled, but you want to get them in the habit
of doing it. Now, maybe, I would say, “Well,
since the plane’s been here for the last week,
and normally we have a card to do this, so
you don’t have to do it.” I will never say that.
I want you to go and find it [the circuit
breaker that is pulled]. [S7]

This is an actual incident that happened,
right? So, what happened was, after
[training] class, you go back to your team.
You’ll either be on the Process [unit],
learning the unit, or you’ll be in a
mechanical job, turning wrenches. So, you
have a three-week mechanical. They
[newly trained] went back to their
mechanical team after 3 weeks. We rolled
into Process for 2 weeks, I got signed off as
a tech. They wanted me to train the
[mechanical team] guy. That’s ridiculous,
you know? “I don’t know, I know enough
to get by on the unit, but I don’t know
enough to train anybody yet. I’ve only been
doing it for 2 weeks!” So, I tried to do the
best I could with it, but that really did that
guy an injustice by me, making me his
mentor when I only have 2 weeks’
experience. When they say to you, “Wow,
you just signed off as being qualified,” I go,
“Yeah, but I got no experience.” It’s
ridiculous. I was really upset about that.
This happened this one time to me, and I
didn’t think that was right at all. [S6]

Participants described elements of training and mentorship that new hires need based on past
experiences and knowledge. Participants explained that training includes establishing
routines, such as printing out the procedure for the job. Participants in aircraft maintenance
identified the importance of mentoring new hires to develop the practice of verifying that
hazardous electrical energy is isolated.
Acquiring experience in hazard recognition. Work activities are ever changing, as
well are the workers whose experiences vary in performing different work tasks. Skill in
recognizing the potential of HaSE develops over time, but when mentors are not experienced
enough to even recognize the value of awareness to HaSE, the recipients of the training are less
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equipped to prepare for hazard potential that develops and must learn from experience. Not only
does a lack of attention to the value of mentorship develop hazard potential for the recipient, but
a low value of training and mentorship signals a persistent practice of learning through
experience over time. Participants described hazard recognition in terms of experience.
Through experience, participants developed principles to recognize hazards that extended
beyond the boundaries of the work environment. When it comes to assessing incident potential,
participants described that subject matter experts who have vast experience lend insight when
decisions are made to repair critical systems. Participants recognized that experience develops
over time, that technical book knowledge is a supplement to experience, and that a loss of
experience follows attrition. Participants adopted and applied principles of hazard awareness
beyond the workspace environment to daily life. The role of experience in developing
knowledge about hazards is described in Table 10.
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Table 10
Acquiring Experience in Recognizing Hazards
Aircraft Maintenance
You basically look at it [the hazard] and try to
make a determination based on your
experience. You don’t want somebody that’s
only got 18 months of experience working on
an airplane making a decision that they need to
proceed forward on a risky repair. You
wanna’ seasoned mechanic who’s got the
authority to make that type of decision,
because if you don’t, that program’s
completely worthless. For safety aspect, then,
I’m looking for a participants matter expert.
Somebody who’s got experience working on
that system. And not just a little bit of
experience, but vast experience, similar types
of conditions that they’ve had to work through
in the past. [S2]

Petrochemical Operations
In my earlier years, you don’t know nothin’.
I didn’t know what to expect, to be honest
with you, but I think experience gives you
better information than anything could ever
give you; a book or nothing. But you need
book training, just to begin the job. Can’t
go out there just dumb, happy and dumb. In
the later days, I had more information to
contribute to my Board [operator], and that
only comes from experience. [S4]

As you begin to progress through your
career, all the experience starts leaving.
People retire, you start losing a lot of
experience. So, you have to be sure that
you do it right. So the people coming
behind me, I was always trying to show ’em
What I’m saying, you practice it at work, you
the right way to do things. There’s always a
normally take it home also when you’re doing few shortcuts you can take, do it a certain
tiny matters. If I have a ladder, I would look at way, but you don’t wanna’ do that if you
it and say, “Okay, I’m 10 pounds above the
can help it. But the experience factor is a
maximum weight of this ladder. Should I use
big thing too. You gotta’ keep an eye on
it? If he wasn’t in the habit of doing that, he
your new people. They should always be
would just climb up the ladder. Now you go to out there with someone who’s experienced,
the store and you say, “I need a ladder that
or you can trust to train ‘em right. [S6]
legally would be in the weight range.” So,
you’re in the habit of using the right equipment
for the right job. That’s the norm. You
develop a norm. [S7]
Participants described that hazard recognition is acquired through experience and explained
how experience declines through attrition. Participants adopted principles of hazard
recognition that transfer beyond the work environment and are utilized in daily
circumstances.
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How Hazards Act as Intrusive Obstacles to the Work Process: Key Question One
In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical operations
describe hazards of the work environment? Hazards were described as intrusive obstacles that
disturb or hinder the work process; are not limited by a physical, visible presence; and are not
always manifest as such. When a hazard was recognized, participants evaluated the degree of
obstruction or potential for interruption to the process before deciding to take action or not to
mitigate the hazard. Participants described hazards in a variety of ways and classified them into
three broad categories according to appearance: (a) Physical, (b) Chemical, and (c) Hazards in
the surrounding work environment (HaSE).
Participants went beyond classifying hazards by appearance to describe hazards in terms
of attitude. For example, unmitigated housekeeping deficiencies may or may not be recognized
as such, and the decision to take action or not in applying a corrective measure is implied as
attitude towards hazard mitigation when a deficiency is recognized as a potential hazard.
Participants also recognized that not all hazards manifest visibility.
When compared to other hazard types, physical hazards are more visible and as such,
command more urgency to resolve. Hazards described as undetected by visible appearance
alone, or the lack thereof, include some chemical fluids and gases. Beyond chemical hazards,
participants described other hazards that influence the capacity to work. Demands of shiftwork,
the commute, housekeeping practices, fatigue, and stress influence work practices. Participants
acted purposefully to follow procedures to the letter and to don PPE to prevent infliction of
potentially damaging injuries from chemicals.
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Participants observed that processes to handle hazardous chemicals included more
safeguards to process safety and the environment over time. When it comes to personal safety,
participants acquired skills in hazard recognition through experience. Participants learned about
the potential of existing hazards through experience. Some HaSE are less immediately
recognized. Such is the case for training and mentorship.
Participants recognized when the present levels of knowledge and experience were
insufficient to support the role of trainer and mentor after a minimum period of being qualified
on the job. Participants demonstrated that hazard recognition is an action of observation. The
skill to recognize is acquired through experience. Participants expressed how demand for
experienced mentors is stated in as simple a term as recognizing that the present level of
knowledge is insufficient to assume responsibility to undertake a job. The hazards that
participants described are presented in Figure 6.
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Description of Hazards in Aircraft Maintenance and Petrochemical Environments
•

Hazards are recognized as intrusive obstacles that disturb or hinder the work
process, are not limited by a physical, visible presence, and are not always
manifest as such. (Reference Table10, Acquiring Experience in Recognizing
Hazards; Table 15, Training and Mentorship Through History)

•

Hazards are classified into three broad categories according to appearance: (a)
Physical, (b) Chemical, and (c) Hazards in the Surrounding Work Environment
(Reference How a Hazard is Described: Key Question One)

•

Hazards are described in terms of worker attitude towards hazard mitigation
when a deficiency is recognized as a potential hazard. For example, the
decision to take action or not in applying a corrective measure to resolve poor
housekeeping when deficiencies are recognized is implied as attitude.
(Reference Table 4, Housekeeping Principles and Hazard Identification)

•

Physical hazards appear more visibly and more prominently than other hazards,
and as such, command more urgency to resolve. The decision to take action or
not to mitigate physical hazards is variable. (Reference Table 4, Housekeeping
Principles and Hazard Identification)

•

Hazards that influence the capacity to work include the demands of shiftwork,
the commute, housekeeping practices, fatigue, and stress. (Reference Table 5,
Fatigue, Stress, and the Commute as Physical Hazards; Table 4, Housekeeping
Principles and Hazard Identification)

•

Purposeful actions that include following procedures to the letter and donning
PPE are applied to prevent infliction of potentially damaging injuries from
chemicals. (Reference Table 7, Personal Agency to take action in Chemical
Hazard Environments)

•

Discernment of hazards is acquired through experience. Knowledge of the
potential of existing hazards is developed through experience. (Reference
Table 10, Acquiring Experience in Recognizing Hazards)

•

The demand for experienced mentors is stated in as simple a term as
recognizing that the present level of knowledge is insufficient to assume
responsibility to undertake a job. (Reference Table 9, Inadequate Training and
Mentorship to I.D. Hazards)

Figure 6. Participant descriptions of hazards.
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How a Near Miss is Defined: Key Question Two
How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground operations and
petrochemical operations?
Elements of the Near Miss Definition
The definition of a near miss incident event was expressed according to the perspective of
the individual, and each participant had experienced near miss events. The definition was guided
by experience, personality, knowledge, and personal agency to take action when an event
occurred. The definition was dependent on the outcome of the event, and the event was
categorized based on severity. In other words, participants qualified the degree of the expected
outcome by post-assessment evaluation and then concluded how serious the event could have
been.
The definition of a near miss incident event contained the following elements. Each
element is listed in the order the interview was conducted.
Knowledge of the potential for equipment failure or not. You know that the seal’s starting to
go bad, and then that seal does or doesn’t go bad. Well if it doesn’t go bad, then that’s, well
something that could’ve happened but didn’t. Or if it does go bad, it’s something that you knew
was going to go bad that did go bad. [S1]
Action or no action against an adverse event resulting in no serious injury or equipment
damage. If something happens that’s undesirable, that something is done about it or it just
doesn’t result in a serious injury or equipment damage, I think that’s a near miss. The term “near
miss” is tricky these days because we’ve really, in recent years, they have gotten away from the
term “near miss” because anything undesirable that happened was considered an incident. [S3]
Actions against events that almost resulted in or caused no major injury or accident. For
things that almost were, but didn’t cause major injury, or accident that we were able to alleviate,
whether it was by dumb luck or effective, preventative measures, I call it a near miss. That’s
basically a near miss. [S2]
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The beginning of an incident that did not materialize. And near miss is that somebody came
close to having an incident but didn’t result in an incident. So, the near miss is the beginning of
everything [S4].
Preparation for a sudden external disturbance with potential to injure. If you are not
careful and don’t have enough individuals handling it [aircraft aileron] while you’re trying to
install it on the aircraft itself, it doesn’t take much of a gust of wind for the whole aileron to get
out of control and hurt someone. [S5]
Training into perpetuity. It’s mostly a thing that you need to be familiar and train well. You
can’t have enough training for those incidents. [S7]
An event that includes injuries that are not major. We used to call ‘em near misses at my
refinery. If maybe something would happen where you’re pulling on a wrench and it slips, and
you hit yourself with it or hit the guy next to you. You get a bruise, or you hurt your hand, but
there’s no broken bones, no lacerations, they call those near misses, when someone coulda’
really, if they break a bone, you can’t come to work, so you get a recordable incident. [S6]
The data elements of a near miss that participants described combine to form the near
miss definition.
The Near Miss Definition
A near miss is the beginning [S4] of an unexpected [S1, S6] and undesirable [S3] event
that nearly [S4] or almost [S2] caused major injury or an incident [S4] and may have resulted in
no major or serious [S6, S2] injury or equipment damage [S3]. A near miss includes minor
injuries [S6]. A near miss is alleviated by conscious awareness [S5], prior knowledge [S1],
training into perpetuity [S7], and dumb luck or effective, preventative measures [S2]. The
definition of a near miss (known as “the stated definition”) is used in the next section to examine
how participants interpreted the goal of near miss reporting.
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How the Goal of Near Miss Reporting is Interpreted: Key Question Three
How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?
Elements of the Near Miss Reporting Goal
The purpose of reporting an incident was linked to personal safety. The goal of reporting
an incident event was explained in terms of benefit to the people, the process, and practice.
Participants referenced benefits to personal safety to describe the goal of reporting an incident.
Participants did not separate incident types when describing the purpose of reporting. In other
words, major and minor incident classifications were not used to explain the goal of reporting a
near miss. The goal of reporting an incident event contained the following elements, listed in the
order in which the interview was conducted.
Shift-to-shift communication of local events is applied in future troubleshooting. Something
that’s just as simple as changing a line-up or maybe, just a small power blip, something that may
not necessarily have affected the entire unit. But at least they [next shift] know about it if they
have another power blip or full power outage. “Hey, there’re some other issues that happened on
the previous shift that maybe, was tied to that,” or could help them in troubleshooting. [S1]
Collect and communicate detailed incident data to recognize details, and apply to future
learning in preventing or minimizing future prospects. You need to gather the information so
that whatever the incident was could be avoided if it happened again. So if you learned the
series of events that lead to the Type-X incident, then that may allow you in the future if you
could communicate that information to the people that need it, they may be able to break the
chain in the chain of events and stop it from happening again, or reduce the severity of it
happening again. [S3]
Balance the protection and conservation of resources with the management of incident
potential by employing engineering and administrative hazard controls. The purpose of it
[reporting] is to try and control mishap potential by any means necessary, whether it’s
management oversight or training, re-training, or re-designs, engineer-out any type of mishap
potential. But it’s all about protecting people and equipment to conserve money and resources,
and making sure people are safe enough to go home at night to see their family. [S2]
A warning that equips others to apply the lesson in the same environment. It [reporting]
warns people and lets them know what happened, and then, that way, they can be prepared when
they go out in their area. [S4]
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Prevent recurrence by communicating to all affected by the system and applying remedial
training. The purpose, first of all, ensure that it never happens again, and make sure that all
personnel involved know about the incident, and, if there’s a re-training required, then there’ll be
re-training done on individuals that need to be re-trained on certain systems, so they are more
aware of the safety aspects, so there’s no other incident in the future; to prevent an incident or
incidents. [S5]
Broadcast and signal events of serious consequence in documents such as procedures to all
affected by the system. And if it’s [the Type-X event] that serious, everyone that’s doing that
job from that day on would know about it. Possibly making you pull out an update of the
procedure as you’re working, to actually look out for that, so you know the possibility, “this can
happen.” [S7]
Seek out change in a process that does not work. If you keep doing the same thing the same
way, and the same problem keeps happening, you need to adjust that. Something’s not right.
You need to find a better way to do it. Like I said, if the guy’s gonna’ back his truck up and hit
this cement pole, you just don’t wanna’ keep doing that every day, so you try to mitigate that,
and you put on some reflective tape or something that helps him to avoid that. [S6]
The data elements of the incident reporting goal that participants described combine to
form the stated goal of incident reporting:
The Stated Goal of Incident Reporting
The stated goal of reporting an incident as simple as a localized event [S1] is to
communicate [S1] [S3] [S4] [S7] that an event has occurred and to signal that change is needed
[S7], to prepare to control [S3] [S4] [S7] the potential for recurrence [S2] [S3] [S4] [S5] [S7] by
actively learning [S3] [S2] [S7] [S6] and balancing resources [S2]. Based on the findings from
the participants, the goal of reporting an incident is illustrated in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. The stated goal of incident reporting.

A variety of workspaces existed within the work environment. Physical and chemical
hazards, and hazards that developed by virtue of the work itself were present within the
workspace environment. Participants were knowledgeable about the physical and chemical
hazards that existed. Participants relied on experience and training and adopted personal agency
to take action to mitigate hazards.
Job activities were done where hazards existed and in the midst of active processes.
Participants recognized the potential for incidents to occur. The goal of reporting incidents
included active learning to preserve personal safety. The actions participants took after an
incident event occurred are discussed in the next section. The findings were useful to explore the
fourth and final research question.
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How Reporting is Related to the OSHA Goal: Key Question Four
In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the OSHA of
identifying hazards and preventing the recurrence of an incident?
The findings from the previous sections are examined to answer the fourth and final
research question of this study. In the first part of the chapter, participants described hazards,
defined a near miss event, and described the purpose of reporting. A near miss event was
defined according to the perspective of the individual. The purpose of reporting an incident was
linked to personal safety. The purpose of reporting was established as:
The stated goal of reporting an incident as simple as a localized event [S1] is to
communicate [S1] [S3] [S4] [S7] that an event has occurred and to signal that change is needed
[S7], to prepare to control [S3] [S4] [S7] the potential for recurrence [S2] [S3] [S4] [S5] [S7] by
actively learning [S3] [S2] [S7] [S6] and balancing resources [S2].
The approach to present the findings examined the processes and practices participants
used when an incident occurred. The actions that participants applied after an incident event
were examined in relation to the stated goal. The stated goal was examined to evaluate
alignment with the OSHA goal. The OSHA goal is to identify hazards and prevent the
recurrence of an incident. The processes and the customary actions of practice and purpose that
make up the reporting system are illustrated in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Process practice purpose concept for reporting an incident.

The action of reporting served multiple purposes. Sometimes, the path to the goal of
reporting an incident included transformative experiences from which participants adopted
lasting principles. The elements of process and practice within the reporting system were
connected to the stated goal by what participants believed and by what motivated participants to
take action.
The motivation to act depended on what participants believed and what the stated goal
was at the time. The goal of reporting was not static. The findings were presented by separating
what participants do, how participants are motivated to act, and what participants believe. The
next section examines the three attributes used to evaluate the goal of incident reporting: (a)
Motivation, (b) Belief, and (c) History and Purpose.
Association Between Worker Actions and the Goal
The actions that occurred after an incident were associated with beliefs and experiences
that participants had developed over time. Three attributes appraise the goal of incident
reporting: (a) Motivation, (b) Belief, and (c) History and Purpose. The attributes overlapped
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multiple actions. In other words, participants shared similar perspectives of meaning and
purpose. The relationship amongst the motivation to act, what participants believe, and history
and purpose are examined to answer the fourth and final research question. Details of the four
attributes are described in each section.
Motivation. Motivation coincided with a variety of actions that participants described.
Participants were motivated to learn and share incident experiences amongst co-workers.
Participants frequently shared Type-X experiences with co-workers and less frequently or not at
all with supervision. Participants referred to technical manuals and knew the process to correct
identified errors. When situations did not “look” right, participants learned to inquire further.
Participants in aircraft maintenance expressed more openness in sharing incidents, both
formally and informally. Participants described cross-talk, start of shift safety meetings, and
daily work crew briefings as examples of opportunities to discuss continuity of work and to share
experiences in aircraft maintenance.
Participants in both industries described ways in which sharing has potential to result in
negative and positive outcomes, and how attitudes toward sharing change. Participants
developed perspectives about reporting, and experiences with incidents changed perspectives.
With experience, participants developed resolve to adhere to principles.
Participants retained indelible memories from the Type-X incident experience and
continued to share experiences over time. Participants were motivated to act by considering the
value of personal safety. Participants believed in the value of personal safety. When an incident
occurred, participants referenced experience and training to know what actions to take.
Experience and training were highly valued to mitigate incident events.
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Opportunities for training existed when an incident occurred. The descriptions in Table
11 illustrate the value of personal safety as expressed through the action of sharing. The
descriptions in the table also imply association between the actions toward the goal of
communicating incident occurrences and the motivation to share or not.
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Table 11
Motivation to Share Experiences and Learn
Aircraft Maintenance
In my earlier years, I’m learning the system,
and I would always ask questions. I actually
recall a real, real bad incident where I had
asked questions. The individual I had asked,
he blew me off. That actually taught me to
ask questions, but learn about it from books.
And, from then on, it actually made me a
better person. It was very important to me
from then on to read the technical books
myself. I shared that [incident experience]
with many, many, many individuals
throughout my career because I was told
wrong, and to forget about it; that I didn’t
know about it because it was not my system,
and so I didn’t tell anybody ‘til the actual
incident happened. That particular incident
changed my way of thinking. [S5]

Petrochemical Operations
Not generally [shared a Type-X experience
with anyone], or maybe, half the time, shared
with co-workers, but the rest of the time, not
at all. So, a lot of things back then, were
kept from management because we just
didn’t need to have the scrutiny. We didn’t
want to be filling out paperwork. We didn’t
want to risk being punished for something
that was not understood by management
‘cause they didn’t fully comprehend some of
the things we had to do to get the job done.
[S3]

The process [to report an incident] is, if
something’s happened where something’s
dropped, if someone’s hurt, if something
goes wrong, we’re instructed to leave the
area and don’t touch anything. You can’t go
It’s [reporting a Type-X event] very
back in and try and cover for yourself,
effective. It’s a very effective way of getting thinking that you’re gonna’ get in trouble.
things done. Even if you get... Sometimes,
You have to leave, you call your boss, and
you get backlash. They say, “Well, we don’t then they start the investigation. They get
have time.” And I said, “We’ll make time.” ahold of Safety and then Safety comes out,
So, you don’t back down. If it’s that
looks at what happened and then they do
important to you, you continue, and make
what’s it called, a Safety Investigation? A
sure it’s done. If you have time constraints
lot of times, people say, ‘Uh oh, I messed up.
or anything, and somebody says, “Well, you I don’t wanna’ lose my job.’ That was the
can’t do it now.” And is like, “No. It
biggest thing, is people panic, thinking that
doesn’t matter. You’ll get it done.” So, you
they might lose their job because they did
don’t let them get in your way when it comes something unsafe. [S6]
to safety. So, you just stick to your guns,
and you say, “This is what we have to do.”
[S7]
Participants in aircraft maintenance expressed more available opportunities to share.
Participants in both industries explained how attitudes toward sharing are selective.
Experiences with incidents changed perspective. Participants developed resolve to adhere to
principles.
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Beliefs and Attitudes About Post-Incident Actions and the Job Audit
Belief is another attribute used to examine the reporting goal. Participants believed that
experience is the best teacher and that experience is required to recognize hazards to the extent
that hazards are obstructive elements of the work process. Participants identified no substitute
for experience and copious amounts of training to prepare for incidents. Participants in aircraft
maintenance expressed that incidents were used as training opportunities.
Despite the recognized value in training, participants expressed that the delivery of the
training affects how the message is received. Participants understood the relationship between
publicizing an incident and the opportunity for training. At a petrochemical site, performing
safety audits was credited to a span of time in which no injuries were recorded. The beliefs that
participants hold about how incidents are used for training and the perceived benefits of safety
audits are described in Table 12.
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Table 12
Beliefs and Attitudes About Post-Incident Action and Job Audits
Aircraft Maintenance
Petrochemical Operations
If it’s [a near miss] generally a work-relatedtype thing, where it’s work practices or safety
standards and things like that, where I either
knowingly violated a rule, or inadvertently
failed to follow a step, it was used as more of a
training opportunity that identified a defect, a
deficiency in our training processes, that were
broadcast across the organization? But it if
was something that was incorrect tech data that
was being used to repair an aircraft, that puts
you at risk, that would get investigated all the
way out, and even getting engineering and
simulations and everything else involved,
looking for potential damage indicators that
you could be exposed to. [S2]

Just your experience [how you know what
actions to take after a Type-X event occurs]
and your knowledge of the [process] Unit
and knowing what you need to do [after a
Type-X event] to stop a leak or shut a pump
off. [S1]
You have to experience it to learn from it.
That’s the best way to learn, is to actually
go through it. [S3]

Unfortunately, sometimes people think
they’re [safety audit observers] gonna’ get
in your business, and then, “Well, we saw
this guy doing something unsafe,” and you
talk to his supervisor and then, the next
You can’t have enough training for those
thing you know, you gotta’ answer all these
incidents. It’s mostly a thing that you need to
questions and go on some kinda’ remedial
be familiar [with], and train well. [S7]
training, ‘cause you just didn’t do it right.
But, anyway, we tend to police our own, I
So, the biggest thing in my opinion, with the
guess you could say. Seems to work too.
way management manages the distribution of
We haven’t had an injury in a long time. I
that information. If they arbitrarily brief it in a think, I forget when the last one was. Yeah,
tone that demoralizes their workforce or makes it really helped a lot. [S6]
it so that information doesn’t seem important,
and they’ll think everybody’s, “They’ll think
we’re stupid,” that type of thing. They’ll take
a derogatory connotation. But if it’s presented
in a way, and it’s more of a learning, “I’m
trying to protect you”-type thing, versus
“You’re stupid, you need to fix this”-type
manner, it’s a lot better received. [S2]
Participants in aircraft maintenance recognized that the aim of the process of publicizing
incidents is to correct deficiencies in training, but the way training is delivered determines
how the message is received. Participants illuminated the value of experience required to
assess and respond when a Type-X event occurred. Participants in petrochemical operations
credited safety audits for the prevention of injuries.
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Beliefs About the Principle of Reporting Itself
The concept of managing the reporting goal itself is another characteristic related to
belief and is used to examine the incident reporting goal. At the time an incident occurs,
participants evaluated the incident to determine if the event rose to the level of a formal report.
Participants felt comfortable sharing experiences of past incident events amongst themselves.
Participants used different modes of communication, from cross-talk and shift turn-over
discussions to phone calls, to convey that an incident had occurred. When it comes to making a
formal report, participants described a lack of transparency in the process itself, accompanied by
punitive effects.
Participants did not believe the goals of incident reporting are communicated with a level
of sincerity. Participants theorize that a high volume of incidents signals the process may need
attention and result in adverse impressions. Participants believe the level of knowledge required
to understand the circumstances surrounding an incident is lacking at the supervision level.
Table 13 references descriptions of what participants believe about the role of management in
reporting.
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Table 13
Beliefs About the Principles of Reporting
Aircraft Maintenance

Petrochemical Operations

It’s [reporting] a lot about how
knowledgeable the people in management
are about the event, and what they deem
necessary to correct it and prevent it from
happening again. [S2]

A lot of the times, they’re [management]
more into keeping paperwork and keeping
more of a report format so that when, if
something does happen, or you know
something’s about to happen because you’ve
been warned of it so many times. So, it all
Promoting it [hazard identification] is kind of depends on whether it’s being looked at from
a double-edged sword. You promote it so
a management side or the operations side of
everybody knows the hazards out there. But it. [S1]
it also brings your community closer, letting
everybody know that there are issues with
I don’t know if the average operator is getting
the equipment or issues with procedures and all the reports. It’s distributed at a certain
practices. The bad side of it is, it also can
level of management, but a lot of the ones that
cause management to lose faith in the
weren’t major, I don’t think the information’s
confidence of the workforce. So, that’s the
conveyed across all levels of people working.
negative side of it, because if the
[S3]
management loses confidence in the ability
of the workforce, then they take actions that
You have to show people how it [the incident]
the workforce deems as negative or
affects them personally, and how they can
retaliatory, and that kind of makes it where
make a positive contribution to it. I mean,
they don’t want to report things. [S2]
that’s the bottom line. I think, a lot of times,
operators feel like they are just being dictated
And there’s always new equipment and
to, and they’re being talked down to, and I
there’s always new individuals, so there’s
don’t think . . . The company doesn’t have a
constant incidents happening, but the ones
lot of sincerity when they come at you with
that I’ve worked through, worked with, and
some of their safety programs? So, it doesn’t
we had minimized a lot of these incidents
feel like a collaborative effort. I can tell you
due to reporting because there’s always a
from personal experience that you could do
new procedure that comes out to do certain
nothing wrong and still [be disciplined] just
things a certain way, and that, to me, if you
because it was not fully understood what
don’t report, then nobody knows, and it
happened, and management, quite often,
doesn’t get better. So, we wouldn’t solve
doesn’t want to understand. They just sorta’
certain incidents from not happening again,
wanna’ close it out. [S3]
no recurring events. [S5]
Participants believe the level of knowledge required to understand the circumstances that
surround an incident is lacking at the supervision level. Based on experience with reporting,
participants believe the deficiency impedes the transparency of the process in terms of
receiving feedback, access to reports, discipline, and partnership.
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Purpose Examined Through History
The final characteristic used to examine the near miss reporting goal is the purpose.
Participants describe competing goals between supervision and the worker. Participants recalled
that feedback from the reports submitted was not timely or did not happen. Participants believe
management could flag incident reports as opportunities for re-training and updates to
procedures.
Participants identified paperwork as a key component of reporting and that the process of
reporting had the potential to polarize the reporter from supervision. Participants believe the
formal path to reporting contained obstructions to the action to report an incident. Participants
indicated that resolve to maneuver the reporting system developed with age and experience.
Over time, a challenge developed to build individual resolve against competing attitudes
within the reporting system. The challenge implies that either the reporting goal of the owners of
the reporting system was not aligned with the reporter or the function of the reporting system
was not transparent. Participants also signaled the belief that there are differences in opinion
about what should or should not be reported. Participants stated that clear distinction is needed
about what should be and what should not be reported. Table 14 describes the attitudes that
developed over time through experiences with reporting, and the beliefs about transparency of
the system.
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Table 14
Belief in the Reporting Function Over Time
Aircraft Maintenance

Petrochemical Operations

Just because I know it was possible, doesn’t
mean that 350 people in the organization knew
it was possible. And that information has to
get out because if the information gets out and
saves one person? It was valuable information,
regardless of if the 349 knew it. If it gets out
and it raises the awareness for one single
person, that information potentially just saved
their life. So, the biggest thing in my opinion,
is with management, with the way
management manages the distribution of that
information. [S2]

One thing I noticed straight from the beginning
was a lotta’ stuff didn’t get reported. Maybe
have a class and have everybody on board as to
how to use it; what should be reported and
what shouldn’t be reported. [S1]

If it meant something to you, you don’t care
about who you’re getting pressure from, and
it’s like, “Well, that’s just minor.” It means a
lot to you? You’ll stick with it. I think, over
time, I see that increasing when you get older.
You tend to take less liberty and make sure
everything is done right. As a youth, you don’t
have the experience. You’re a new mechanic,
you only know so much. But, as you’ve been
in the industry all these years, you see this
happen, this happen, this happen. And
knowing the equipment better, you have some
kinda’ clue as to what can happen. So, you
take all that into effect, and you make
decisions based on that. [S7]

There’s kind of a corruption of the system?
We were logging in things [incident reports]
that were pretty inconsequential? And
“nothing-you-could-do-about-it-to-prevent-itfrom-happening-again” kinda’ stuff? That was
the nature of things. People were logging
incidents as a method of showing that, ‘Hey,
look at all these incidents we have. We need a
budget to get something.’ So, there was a lot
of people that were having stuff logged in the
incident reporting system as a political means
of getting a budget item approved or stuff like
that, or just to log it somewhere to track it.
There was a lot of tracking going on, and some
of our incident reporting things. It’s an
amount of information that gets overwhelming.
[S3]

Participants believe the reporting system is not transparent. Resolve to overcome system
resistance to reporting developed with age and experience. The attitudes within the system
signal differences in the types of reports that are required. Participants implied that the system
lacks transparency.

Training and Mentorship Examined Over Time
Participants indicated that qualities of mentorship include experience and attitude.
Experience is needed to develop the skill of hazard recognition, and hazard identification is an
element of the OSHA goal. The attitudes participants developed toward training and mentorship
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are based on individual experiences and assessment through self-reflection. Mentoring and
experiences with re-training related to near miss incidents frame individual perceptions.
Attitudes were shaped by experiences during the training phase and by re-training opportunities
after an incident event. Table 15 describes attitudes of participants about training and
mentorship.

Table 15
Training and Mentorship Through History
Aircraft Maintenance
I would say, as a whole, every system I’ve
seen involved with near miss reporting, if
training was required, it wasn’t put out in a
negative connotation. It was more of a,
“We’re trying to protect you”-type thing,
which the workforce seemed to appreciate a
lot more than resent. [S2]
The number one thing is your training, and
that’s the big thing. So, you know what the
equipment does, you know how the
equipment operates, you know the safety
procedures. That’s the biggest part. So, if the
individual makes a mistake, then you say,
“Okay, this person needs more training.” So,
next time you do that job, this will never
happen again because you know that person is
well-trained. [S7]

Petrochemical Operations
You have to have a mentor, and a mentoring
program, I thought, was the most important
of part of keeping people safe because you
have to have someone who cares. You just
can’t have a mentor who says, “Oh, I’ve got
someone to do all my work today. I’m
gonna’ send him out there to do his rounds
while I sit here.” You don’t want to do that.
That was a very important job, I thought,
mentoring? You have to have the right
people. You have the wrong mentor, it’s not
gonna’ be good for you. [S6]
We’re well-trained on the [process] Units we
work. But, yeah, you have to know what’s in
your equipment. So, as soon as you know
what’s leaking, they know exactly what you
have to do. But yeah, you need to know
what’s going on in your Unit. [S6]

Participants regarded training and mentorship as essential elements of hazard identification.
The attitude of the mentor in the training phase and the attitude during re-training after an
incident event influence learning.

Over time, participant experiences with incident events shaped perceptions of incident
reporting. Each participant experienced a Type-X incident event in which no injuries or damage
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to equipment occurred. Figure 9 captures the extent of participant experiences with Type-X
events.

Participant Experiences with Near Miss Events
•

Yeah, I would say so [I experienced a Type-X event]. I mean, I was standing
pretty close to everything that had happened, so I mean, had that guy not have
gotten that valve closed in time, that probably could have directly affected me.
[S1]

•

I have experienced many Type-X events. I don’t know if I can describe any
that did not result in injury or a severe equipment damage. I mean, those are
generally so minor, I just, you just kind of, keep moving along. In the old
days, in the 90s when I first started, those weren’t even reported. [S3]

•

Yeah, I have. I’ve had quite a few near misses. And I would say I had a lot
more when I was younger, when I was less experienced, and didn’t
particularly pay attention to the rules and the regulations as much as I did as I
got older. [S2]

•

Yes, I have [experienced a Type-X event]. There’ve been many of ‘em. [S4]

•

Over the years, the incidents that I have witnessed and experienced myself,
reporting has made a difference. [S5]

•

Yeah, the good thing is, there’re always people around. [S7]

•

Yeah, we used to call ‘em near misses at my refinery. [S6]

Figure 9. Participant experiences with near miss events.

Summary
The history of reporting was described by reflecting on goals and beliefs about what
could be learned from reporting. The reporting system was associated with an indicator of
potential or a lack of potential. In other words, when an event occurred, participants referenced
past experiences to make evaluations on the present and apply that appraisal to the decision.
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Participants aligned the purpose of reporting with preserving personal safety. In other words, the
reason for the action matched the reporting mode. Over time, communication about near miss
events developed across internal channels.
Written feedback reports were lagging and not readily accessible. Over time, participants
shared near miss experiences more openly with co-workers. Participants questioned how major
incidents were classified and treated with the same rigor as incidents perceived to be of lesser
effect. Participants believe the reporting system is faulty. Participants indicated that there were
time lapses between the time since the event and the feedback. Participants sensed changes in
the relationship with management over time. A less cohesive environment developed that
obstructed the path to incident reporting. Participants utilized reflection to communicate the
experiences amongst co-workers with the goal of preserving personal safety.
The near miss definition and the goal of reporting a near miss incident (known as the
“stated goal”) were used to evaluate how the OSHA goal to identify hazards and prevent incident
recurrence aligned with the actions that workers took when an incident event occurred. In other
words, the OSHA goal was weighed against the themes drawn from the near miss definition and
from the goal of reporting.
Participants agreed on the purpose of reporting. Participants verbally described past near
miss events to co-workers. The elements of reporting were associated with experience,
knowledge, and mentorship. Over time, participants developed resolve to overcome demands to
circumvent established procedures. Participants acknowledged that reporting was effective but
can lead to punitive actions when management does not understand the process. Participants
developed communication more openly over time.
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Each participant had multiple personal experiences with Type-X events. Some
participants experienced training that was less than optimal. Participants indicated that new hires
are well-qualified for the positions and that managers should acquire a level of knowledge about
incident events. The reporting goal data were examined for alignment with the OSHA goal of
incident reporting to identify the hazard and prevent the recurrence of an incident. A discussion
of the findings follows in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

The near miss reporting study was developed to understand the worker perspective of
reporting an incident. A general qualitative design was utilized for this study, and the method of
data collection was individual interviews. This chapter is organized into three sections. Chapter
5 begins with a summary of the findings from Chapter 4. A discussion of the findings follows,
and the third and final section presents recommendations for policy and practice. Three primary
research questions laid the foundation for the study.
Key question one. In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical
operations describe hazards of the work environment?
Key question two. How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground
operations and petrochemical operations?
Key question three. How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?
Key question four. In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the
OSHA goals of identifying hazards and preventing the recurrence of an incident?
Summary
In Chapter 4, the findings of the near miss reporting study were discussed. The definition
of a near miss was described in terms of personal safety and the safety of others and included
minor injuries. The purpose of reporting was identified in terms of the benefit to people. The
goal of reporting was illustrated by the Process Practice Purpose principle developed to illustrate
how participants were motivated to act or not to meet the goal of reporting practices (the “how”).
The Type-X event was described in terms of an incident that did not result in injury or
damage to equipment or the environment. Participants shared Type-X events amongst coworkers and actively learned from incident experiences. Participants believe that the path to
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reporting contained obstructions to the action to report an incident. Participants aligned the
purpose of reporting with personal safety and the safety of others. Finally, participants
acknowledged that reporting was effective, but can lead to punitive actions when management
does not understand the process.
Discussion
The findings from Chapter 4 are discussed in this section. Three concepts support the
themes of the findings: (a) Beliefs, (b) Motivation to take action, and (c) Purpose. Together, the
concepts form the three-legged stool of the incident reporting perception. Any leg missing
renders the stool out of balance. This section is divided into two parts: worker beliefs in the first
part and motivation, and purpose in the second part. The concepts of belief and motivation to
take action toward a desired purpose are illustrated in Figure 10.

Figure 10. The process purpose practice concept of incident reporting.

The concepts were formed out of the work environment context. The Process, Practice,
Purpose concept was developed and used to demonstrate the path to the incident reporting goal.
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Process refers to “what” was done within the work environment. Practice refers to the actions
that workers took, or the “how.”
Beliefs, motivation, and purpose are three themes that frame the concept of near miss
reporting. In the context of the processes and hazards within the work environment, beliefs,
motivation to action, and purpose were the three recurring themes associated with incident
reporting. Each theme is discussed in the remainder of this section.
What Workers Believe About Incident Reporting
Three prominent beliefs emerged from the findings: (a) Participants believe that the
purpose of reporting an incident was linked to personal safety; (b) Participants also believed
experience and training were of high value when it comes to mitigating an incident, and that
experience is the best teacher; and (c) Participants believe that reporting is necessary to mitigate
incidents but can lead to punitive action when management does not understand the process.
Various paths to accomplishing the same goal exist (Maslow, 1943). In the case of
incident reporting, participants described that the need is to preserve personal safety. Personal
safety links were observed by how workers communicated when an incident occurred.
The value participants ascribed to experience and training is attributed to individual
experiences with initial training and opportunities for re-training when incidents occurred. The
emphasis participants placed on experience implies that the training participants received
insufficiently captured the types of situations participants encountered in the field. Participants
experienced multiple incidents over time. The sheer volume of incidents implies that the goal to
prevent recurrence of an incident is not met.
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Although participants agreed that reporting is a necessary action to mitigate incidents,
experience in the delivery of re-training and initial training influenced the reception of the
message, such that attitudes toward reporting change. So, even when participants believed that
reporting was a functional concept in incident mitigation, personal safety prevailed in
participants’ actions.
Links to Personal Safety
The actions of participants toward the goal of incident reporting were explained in terms
of preserving the safety of the participants and others by delivering the message to a limited
audience. The elements of reporting are complex. When tasked to construct a definition of the
Type-X event, participants were hard-pressed to recall examples of events that did not result in
injury or damage to equipment or the environment. Each participant had experienced multiple
Type-X events. When an incident occurred, participants assessed the event in terms of potential
and decided whether or not to take action. The resulting actions did or did not include reporting.
Communicating an incident. Participants communicated incident events primarily
amongst co-workers, and less with management, inferring that the practice of worker-to-worker
communication is functional to identify the hazard and accomplishes the intended goal.
Conversely, worker-to-worker communication is limited to the receiving audience, such that
others outside the loop of communication are excluded.
Participants explained the goal of reporting an incident event in terms of preserving
personal safety of people. In other words, the actions participants take after an incident occurs
are associated with preserving personal safety and the safety of others. The mode of verbal
communication indicates that participants are motivated to act when personal safety is the goal.
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Considerations in reporting. Although participants defined a near miss incident as an
event that included minor injuries, participants disagreed on whether minor injuries should be
reported. Additionally, participants agreed that all incidents should be reported. The inference is
that a near miss may include a minor injury, and participants may or may not report a near miss
depending on the extent of experience with incidents and incident reporting, even though
participants agreed that all incidents should be reported. The disagreement indicates a
disconnect between the process to report and the actions in practice.
Participants applied individual discretion to report, based on past experiences. The
disagreement between what should be done and what is done is attributed to individual past
experiences in which indelible lessons were learned over time. Two lessons capture the
experiences and resolve of participants to uphold principles to mitigate an incident through
hazard identification.
Experience and training. The individual lessons of hazard mitigation that participants
learned extend from the workplace to home and beyond. Participants adopted lasting principles
to communicate and report hazards and incidents based upon training, transformative
experiences, and mentorship. The following two examples illustrate how, over time, individual
perspectives about what participants believe are entrenched when it comes to identifying hazards
and reporting incidents.
What workers believe: Two lessons in experience and training. In the time following
the transformative near miss experience in the early days of a career in aircraft maintenance, S5
would not shy away from reporting and had adopted the principle to share the experience with
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workers new to the environment. New to the field of maintenance at the time, S5 had reported
an observation to supervision and the observation was ignored.
A near miss of serious consequence was associated with the experience. S5 adopted
advocacy to report hazards into personal life and still maintains the attitude of hazard
identification within the community today. S5 adopted the principle to ask questions, but to
always read the technical data for oneself. The second lesson to be considered about what
participants believe relates to training and mentorship.
As recently as seven years ago, following a 4-week training rotation between process
units and mechanical craft job responsibilities, and after just two weeks of on-the-job experience,
S6 was delegated to train another new worker. S6 since adopted the principle that mentorship
requires more than to be signed off and qualified on a Process Unit, and more than being able to
identify equipment and to possess knowledge about how to perform Operator Rounds. The
discussion about what workers believe about the function of reporting continues in the next
section.
What workers believe: Transparency in the motivation to report. Participants believe
reporting is necessary to mitigate incidents but lack full confidence in the process. In
Petrochemical operations, participants indicated that feedback from reporting was mostly nonexistent and that feedback from incident reports not considered to be major events was not
communicated and not easily accessible. Petrochemical participants also had experience in
reporting that resulted in punitive actions.
In aircraft maintenance, participants identified more available channels of
communication, such as crosstalk, and indicated more openness in communicating with
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supervision. In each industry, participants who were supervisors helped shape insight about the
disconnect between the management process of incident reporting and what participants who
were not supervisors believed. In the third and final section of the discussion, the findings of
incident reporting are examined in terms of motivation.
The Motivation to Report
Participants agreed that reporting is a method to mitigate hazards and avert future
incidents. OSHA (2018) encourages employers to study and evaluate near miss incidents.
Participants indicated that workplace processes to report incidents exist. Participants linked
personal safety to the purpose of reporting an incident. Reporting incidents is recognized as an
effective way to mitigate incidents in the future (NSC, 2013, 2019; U.S. Department of Labor,
2015a). But how is incident reporting linked to the purpose? The motivation to report is
examined in the next section.
Misalignment with the Reporting Goal
Abraham Maslow’s (1943) theory of motivation states that a goal can be achieved
through various paths, that each need influences the other, and that individuals are motivated to
act to achieve a goal. In the case of incident reporting, participants described the need is to
preserve personal safety. Participants who were supervisors described a reporting system that is
overloaded and out of alignment with the intended goal.
In the Process Practice Purpose concept, what participants believe was directed toward
purposeful actions. When the same concept is applied to the data from participants who were
supervisors, the purpose is not aligned. The purpose of reporting is misaligned with the
motivation to report. Participants explained the purpose of reporting in terms of benefit to
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people. Participants who were supervisors described two elements of the reporting system that
challenge the reporting goal: (a) The high volume of incidents and (b) Timeliness of feedback.
A high volume of incidents. Owners of the incident reporting system are motivated to
act to manage the volume of incidents. The applied actions appear to be aimed at sorting and
categorizing incidents of high visibility to meet reporting mandates, such that, in a system where
workers are directed to report everything, a worker must either (a) Believe that near miss
incidents do not provoke urgency, and adopt the attitude that near miss incidents are of minor
consequence and are simply part of the workplace process or (b) Believe the reporting system is
non-transparent and insincere in presenting the goal. The result is a failure of the process to meet
the goal.
Since participants are motivated to action by a need to preserve personal safety, then the
communication of incident events amongst co-workers fulfills that need for an audience limited
by the extent of the communication. On the other hand, owners of the incident reporting process
are motivated to manage the volume of incidents, resulting in attending to incidents of high
visibility and neglecting feedback reports interpreted by participants to be of lesser importance.
The process falls short of the goal when participants recognize that feedback related to near miss
incidents is almost non-existent, and major incident events capture higher visibility.
Timeliness and accessibility of feedback. Participants who were supervisors described
two aspects of feedback. In the first instance, the owners of the reporting system are motivated
to manage the reporting system out of concern for the integrity of the reporting system itself. An
abundance of reporting may signal misinterpretation that a system requires attention. On the
other hand, owners of the reporting process could be motivated by an abundance of reporting if
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benefits to reporting exist, even if the benefits are not aligned with the purpose. The result is a
delay in the feedback to the initiator of the report, and further, to a larger audience of interest.
In a review of 25 non-medical incident reporting systems, Barach and Small (2000)
identified timeliness in feedback as one of eight conflicts that exist within reporting systems.
Actions in the reporting system are directed towards a goal. Each need influences another
(Maslow, 1943).
In the second instance, participants who were supervisors in Petrochemical operations
indicated the inaccessibility of reports. Again, the result is a delay in the feedback to the
intended audience. Across all participants, reporting experiences were both positive and
negative. The number of incidents is a distinguishing factor amongst organizations and low rates
of incidents result in less frequent inspections by OSHA (Miller, 2008).
A focus on keeping incident rates low is a factor in the decision to report. Notably,
participants demonstrated difficulty in capturing the Type-X description of an event that did not
result in injury or damage to equipment or the environment. Of note, participants included minor
injuries in the definition of a near miss event. As a matter of process, participants demonstrated
knowledge about existing policies to report all incidents. As a matter of practice, all participants
had multiple experiences with incidents, such that participants decided to report or not, based on
training and experience.
The Lukic et al. (2013) study examined how individual elements contribute to learning
from incidents in the oil and gas industry. Lukic et al. found that experience and safety values
influence participation in safety objectives. The value of reporting a near miss event is
unrecognized as an opportunity to mitigate future incidents (NSC, 2013). A near miss is an
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opportunity to apply active learning. The motivation to align with the goal of reporting is
recognized by the actions taken by participants and the owners of the reporting process.
Recommendations for Future Research
Aircraft maintenance and petrochemical operations share common traits in incident
reporting, but specific issues exist in each industry. Organizations may be inclined to keep some
incident reporting matters in-house if mandatory reporting requirements permit. Future research
must be directed at examining how organizations communicate and respond to near miss reports
within each industry system. Specifically, “On the petrochemical side, the existing process of
reporting is subject to delay,” as participants described. The finding does not mean that delay in
the process is exclusive to one industry.
The future research is urgent to minimize the delay in response to initial reports.
Participants also reported that communication amongst co-workers exists. Near miss data
collection extends the advantage of accessibility over incidents of greater consequence (NSC,
2013). A broader understanding of the elements of worker-to-worker communication and how
the practice has changed over time will inform the reporting process of trends in reporting and
engage a larger audience within the incident reporting system.
Implications for Policy and Practice
The implication for practice is that a partnership between the worker and the organization
is needed to meet the challenge of keeping workers safe. The Principle of Understanding model
demonstrates how a partnership optimizes active learning from near miss incidents. The value of
learning from near miss reporting is acknowledged (NSC, 2013; U.S. Department of Labor,
2013). Two implications for practice result from the near miss reporting study. Barach and
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Small (2000) studied near miss reporting systems from aviation, petrochemical processing,
NASA, and the nuclear industry to identify characteristics of reporting from nonmedical
industries. A review of 25 reporting systems resulted in the analysis of 12 of the reviewed
systems. An analysis of the 12 reporting systems found that 2 of 12 were anonymous, and 7 of
12 were confidential (Barach & Small, 2000).
Barach and Small (2000) also determined that data from near miss incidents are more
abundant and accessible than other incident data. The near miss reporting study found that
worker-to-worker communication about incident events exists, and workers are motivated to act
to preserve personal safety and the safety of others. In the Lukic et al. (2013) study, participants
distinguished the motivation to preserve personal safety from concern about the safety of others.
The recommendation of the near miss reporting study is that owners of incident reporting
systems should utilize available channels of worker-to-worker communication to include
confidential and anonymous reporting in incident reporting systems.
Participants in the near miss reporting study also echoed the need to receive timely
feedback. The desire for feedback to the reporter was identified as an obstacle to reporting
(Barach & Small, 2000). The near miss reporting study found that the feedback, which
participants received from reporting was not timely and sometimes non-existent. Participants
who were supervisors indicated that reports were not easily accessible or available and described
actions within the reporting system that were not aligned with the incident reporting goal.
Individuals are motivated to act based on an existing need (Maslow, 1943). The
misalignment of purpose resulted in opportunities lost to learn from incidents. The
recommendation of the near miss reporting study is that owners of incident reporting systems
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must include transparency in the process because cultural transformations and change do not
develop overnight.
The Principle of Understanding model was developed to understand how a developing
partnership drives change between the worker and the organization through active learning from
near miss incidents. The recommendations of the near miss reporting study are grounded in the
research findings. The recommendations are designed to develop and sustain a culture of
preserving personal safety.
Research findings form the three-legged stool principle of understanding about how
active learning from near miss incident data is applied to work practice in industrial
environments. Active learning evaluates the circumstances surrounding a near miss event and
applies lessons from past events in a cumulative way such that hazard mitigation results. Near
miss data facilitate active learning.
The principle of understanding is applied within the work environment because near miss
incident events occur in the course of the work process and in the presence of hazards. The goal
of the principle of understanding is to apply active learning from near miss incidents as soon as
is practical. The path to active learning leads to insight about the three-legged stool principle of
understanding.
How the Principle of Understanding Develops
Figure 11 illustrates how active learning from near miss incident events develops from
the principle of understanding.

Figure 11. Development of the principle of understanding about active learning from near miss incident events.
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Active learning develops out of an assumption that both the worker and the organization
want to operate in an environment where hazards are recognized and mitigated. Regrettably,
near miss events do not provoke the urgency to action and do not rise to the level of analytical
priority as accidents, such that near miss data is under-collected. Two paths to active learning
arise when the circumstances surrounding an incident are analyzed and when unanticipated
hazards are recognized.
The bureaucratic path must meet regulatory mandates of compliance, such that incidents
are classified and tiered according to severity. The informal element is aligned with preserving
personal safety and the safety of others. A challenge to active learning from near miss incidents
arises when the paths to learning are out of alignment. The goal of the principle of
understanding is to act as soon as practical to close the gap between the two paths by applying
active learning.
Active Learning from Near Miss incident Events
Active learning is the process of evaluating the conditions surrounding an event and
applying the data to the work process in a cumulative way, such that in the long-term, reduction
or elimination of near miss incidents results. Active learning requires continuous application of
lessons from incidents to the work process as soon as practical. The key to active learning is the
continuous application of adopted principles, such that learning is cumulative. Adopting
principles is a way of learning and doing through observation and action. Figure 12 illustrates
the context of active learning
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Figure 12. The context of active learning from near miss incidents.

The path to active learning from near miss incidents begins with actions directed by the
work process. Customary practices (the “how” actions) and procedural activities (the “what”
actions) are oriented toward a work production objective. Incidents occur in the course of doing
work. The bureaucratic path and the informal element are the two active channels used to reach
the active learning objective.
The two paths are driven by the beliefs and motivation of the worker and the
organization. The principle of understanding partnership closes the gap between the two paths to
facilitate the application of active learning. Near miss incident data present a distinct value to
active learning. Three incidents in industry illustrate the value of incident data.
Air Canada taxiway overflight Flight 759. On July 7, 2017, at 2356 Pacific Standard
Time, Air Canada Airbus A320-211 Flight 759 overflew a taxiway on descent to San Francisco
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International Airport (SFO) where four aircraft were positioned for takeoff (National
Transportation Safety Board Incident Report [NTSB], 2017). The incident aircraft approached
the taxiway instead of the runway, and overflew one aircraft at 100 feet above ground level,
made a low-altitude go-around, overflew a second aircraft at 60 feet, overflew a third aircraft at
200 feet, overflew a forth aircraft at 250 feet, and landed safely on the second approach attempt.
An incident investigation by the NTSB (2017) determined that the configuration of the
runway changed in February 2017 at the start of a maintenance project to re-surface and upgrade
lighting on one of two runways that run parallel to the incident taxiway. The runway under
maintenance was scheduled to close at 2300 hours each night and most weekends. During the
period of construction, requests from pilots for adjustments to the lighting on the active runway
increased.
Visual lighting indications alone were not sufficient assurance of alignment with the
correct runway during construction. Following the incident, controllers implemented a change in
procedure to communicate needs for lighting adjustments with the first pilot to arrive after dark
during construction periods. The recommendations from the NTSB (2017) include
improvements to cockpit displays and instrument systems that detect misalignment of aircraft
with runways, and ways to optimize runway configuration data.
Boeing 737-8 (MAX). The Boeing Company is the largest aerospace corporation in the
world, manufacturing aircraft since 1916 (Boeing, 2019). A new fleet of 737 MAX aircraft is
the subject of two international accident investigations. The 737 (MAX) holds the distinction of
the fastest-selling aircraft in the history of the Boeing company (Boeing, n.d.).
On October 29, 2018, at 2320 UTC, Pacific Time, Lion Mentari Airlines (Lion Air)
Boeing 737-8 (MAX) Flight JT610 departed from Jakarta with 189 souls on board. The aircraft
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crashed 13 minutes after departure, and no one survived (Tjahjono, 2018). On the incident
aircraft, from October 26, 2018 until October 28, 2018, four flight defects related to speed and
altitude flight controls were logged for maintenance on the Flight and Maintenance log
(Tjahjono, 2018). On March 10, 2019, at 0538 UTC, Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737-8 (MAX)
Flight 302 departed from Addis Ababa Bole International airport (HAAB) with 157 souls on
board. The aircraft crashed after departure, and no one survived (Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia, Ministry of Transport, Aircraft Accident Investigations Bureau [AIB], 2019).
On March 11, 2019, in a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International
Community [CANIC], March 11, 2019, the FAA issued updated guidelines for the safe operation
of the Boeing 737-8 and 737-9 (737 MAX) fleet. The FAA completed a review of the Boeing
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight controls production process
and will continue to provide oversight to Boeing upgrades to MCAS design, flight crew manuals,
and training (FAA, 2019a). The FAA also announced that the agency was provided with no data
to act or to make conclusions regarding the Lion Air Flight JT610 accident and the Ethiopian
Airlines Flight ET302 accident involving the Boeing Model 737-8 airplane (FAA, 2019a).
On March 12, 2019, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency [EASA] issued an
Airworthiness Directive to suspend operation of the Boeing 737-8 and 737-9 Max aircraft in
Europe (European Union Aviation Safety Agency [EASA], 2019). On March 16, 2019, the
Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety, France (BEA), announced that a joint
investigation team of the U.S. NTSB, the Ethiopian AIB, and the BEA together verified data
from the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder, and found “clear similarities” between
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Lion Air Flight 610 and that the investigation team would
continue to study the similarities between the data.
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On March 20, 2019, the FAA announced an Emergency Order of Prohibition to cease
operation of the Boeing 737-8 and 737-9 by U.S.-certificated operators based on developing
information from the investigation that similarities between the two accidents exist (FAA,
2019b). The order affects 387 aircraft worldwide and has not been revoked or revised as of
publication. On April 19, 2019, the FAA confirmed that a Joint Authorities Technical Review
(JATR) team of nine international civil aviation experts will join the FAA and the National
Aviation and Space Administration (NASA) to evaluate the design of the 737 MAX automated
flight control system for compliance with certification (FAA 2019c).
Exxon Mobil refinery explosion, Torrance, California. On February 18, 2015, an
explosion occurred at the Exxon refinery in Torrance, California. Two workers were injured.
The event had potential for a catastrophic outcome (CSB, 2016). Airborne debris scattered from
the explosion to a distance far enough to strike scaffolding near a tank containing a highly
combustible volume of hydrofluoric acid. The debris struck the scaffolding instead. In a
preliminary report, the CSB compared actions surrounding the event to similar refinery incident
reports in which a review and analysis of hazards for non-routine maintenance did not occur
(CSB, 2016).
Philadelphia Energy Solutions fire. On June 21, 2019, a fire occurred at the
Philadelphia Energy Solutions [PES] refinery. Initial reports indicate that hydrocarbon vapors
were released to atmosphere and ignited (WPVI-TV Action News, 2019). The CSB is
investigating the accident (CSB, 2019). The distinct value of learning from near miss incident
data is applied to the principle of understanding.
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The Principle of Understanding About Active Learning from Near Miss Incidents
The impact of the near miss experience changes what workers believe and changes the
course of progress for the organization, and sometimes, the industry. Figure 13 illustrates the
three-legged stool principle of understanding.

Figure 13. Three-legged stool principle of understanding about active learning from near miss
incident events.

The cornerstone action of the stool is to apply active learning from near miss incidents as
soon as practical. Each leg of the stool supports active learning within the work process. There
are two paths to take action or not when a near miss event occurs. The informal channel is
recognized by actions directed toward preserving personal safety.
The worker evaluates the situation and makes the decision to take action or not. Over
time, workers develop perspectives about reporting, but experience with near miss events
changes perspectives. A system of metrics is structured to meet mandates for compliance with
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regulatory requirements within the Bureaucratic path. The Bureaucratic path is a formalized,
standardized approach applied in the analysis of incidents.
The motivation to take action or not after a near miss incident event occurs is supported
by what workers believe and by the extent of buy-in from the organization. The circumstances
that surround each incident are original. In other words, for each future condition or situation,
the worker, the environmental conditions, and the HaSE are all subject to change. Buy-in from
the organization is necessary to strengthen the partnership towards the goal of hazard mitigation.
If meaningful action is the goal, then hazards must be equally recognized as such by both
the organization and the worker. A recurring pattern of near miss incidents signals that learning
beyond the circumstance of a single event alone is needed. Change demonstrates an
understanding of active learning. Active learning from near miss incident events facilitates
change.
Three components function to support a guided approach to understanding the active
learning principle: (a) the level of regard for near miss events and a pervasive attitude based on
incident outcome present a challenge to recognize the value of a near miss, (b) the cumulative
utility of near miss data applied to minimize the learning gap and to understand the motivation to
take action or not to change perceptions about the severity of incident outcomes, and (c) the
impact of a near miss incident and communication of hazard mitigation.
Low Regard for Near Miss Incidents and a Pervasive Attitude Towards Outcome
When the work process is working as it should, it is easy to discount the value of near
miss data and ignore the intangible value of safe work. It is a challenge to recognize value in
near miss event outcomes that are of low appeal. However, low-appealing outcomes do not
signal low hazard potential. There is a tendency to focus on outcomes and to categorize low-
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appealing results such that value in learning from near miss data is reduced to a system of
cataloging and tracking. The prevalent categorization is sufficient to permeate the organization
and influence reporting perceptions that direct a focus on outcomes and overlook new hazards in
such a way that cumulative learning is limited to old data.
Each incident originates out of unexpected circumstance. The level of regard for incident
outcomes of low-appeal suggests that over time, new hazard identification is de-emphasized or
that existing hazards have re-surfaced. Each near miss event has potential value to identify new
hazards. Work environments are not static, and the reality is that learning from near miss
incidents is a cumulative process in which new circumstances are presented within changing
work environments.
Cumulative learning occurs through the on-going process of refining guiding principles
using near miss data to achieve the intangible goal of keeping workers safe. Refinement
develops through the analysis of new data. Data from each near miss event is valuable when
applied to cumulative learning because each circumstance is unique. The worst-case potential
outcome is appropriate to apply because each near miss is original and HaSE are not static. The
intangible benefit of a low visibility outcome does not sound the alarm to generate immediate
action and to regard near miss data as if the outcome were worst case.
The pervasive attitude aligns near miss analysis based on outcome, but the analysis is
unlike the approach to the calculating, predictive, and foreseeable measures of job hazard
assessments that precede job tasks. The idea of classification before analysis is important
because job hazard analyses precede the job task, and the usefulness of post-incident analysis is
limited by the application of old data when classification occurs before analysis, which suggests
that chronic hazards persist or that new hazards are presented. The problem is that a focus on
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classifying the incident type based on outcome limits the cumulative potential for active learning
by using the outcome as the basis for analysis.
In the case where the outcome is considered minor and the worst-case potential is not
considered, learning from the incident is limited to the severity of the result at hand. The utility
of near miss data to cumulative learning is intangible. When a near miss occurs, measurements
of the full extent of hazard severity in the surrounding environment are uncalculated since the
conditions of one near miss are subject to change.
HaSE that are not under the direct control of the worker can be anticipated, yet are not
predicted, and present obstacles to safe work. As such, HaSE maintain an elusive presence, low
visibility, and are subject to limited communication when near miss analysis is limited by
classifying the outcome. Organizations apply less urgency in attention to incidents in which the
resulting outcomes are perceived to be of lesser consequence by assigning a severity of
consequence based on outcome and not worst-case.
In the process of categorizing incident events, a tiered system of prioritization is applied
to incidents of lesser consequence. For incidents in which the outcome of a near miss is less
immediate, the resulting action provokes a level of urgency often associated with the category of
incident. As such, within the bureaucratic path, the focus on categorizing incident events renders
incidents of lesser consequence in a dismal position in terms of potential for meaningful
evaluation and analysis.
Incidents are categorized and tiered according to the result or outcome of the event. The
practice subjects near miss incidents to a lower level of urgency when the result of the incident
does not present an “immediate” problem in the work process. The problem with such a casual
approach to analyzing near miss incidents of low consequence is that evaluation based on
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outcome tends to precede analysis, and new HaSE data are excluded from building cumulative
learning opportunities.
Cumulative Utility of Near Miss Data
It is essential to acknowledge the gap that exists between the bureaucratic element and
the informal path to be able to recognize compounding utility. Cumulative or compounding
utility means the data surrounding each event are useful and are applied to change in the work
process, such that the way in which work is done (the “how”) actively incorporates learned
principles. In other words, the extent of recovery from a trip or potential fall is not an indicator
of the degree of severity of what could have been, nor does recovery gauge or influence the full
extent of a future event.
Unmitigated HaSE present risks to personal safety when hazards are not directly
controlled by the worker. In other words, a worst-case potential must be assumed to advance
active learning from near miss incidents because the dynamics of the surrounding environment
are constantly changing. Insomuch as HaSE present obstacles to safe work, the approach to
recognizing hazards that result from near miss incident events and the action that follows must
focus on the cumulative utility of near miss data.
Given the original conditions and circumstances that surround a near miss incident, future
conditions are subject to change. As such, active learning must capture the cumulative
component of hazards in changing environments. Active learning applies lessons from near miss
incident events to the work process as soon as practical, such that, in the long term, reduction in
frequency or elimination of events and refinement of developing principles result.
The action applied to active learning demonstrates individual need. Basic individual
needs are conceptualized on a continuum, and, depending on demand, one need category
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presides over another (Maslow, 1943). Near miss data are more abundant and accessible than
other incident data types (Barach & Small, 2000).
Although accidents are more visible, a larger amount of data from near miss incidents is
available for analysis since accidents occur at lower rates (van der Schaaf, 1992). It makes sense
to understand how near miss incident data are useful when applied cumulatively to change the
work process through active learning. The remaining two sections combine to complement the
additional utility of near miss data: (a) The motivation to act toward the active learning goal and
(b) Closing the gap to active learning by changing perceptions of incident severity and impact,
and optimizing communication after an event.
The motivation to take action or not. According to Maslow’s theory of motivation,
goals are connected to individual needs and motivation (Maslow, 1943). Each need influences
another need, there are variations in the paths to reaching a goal, and the motivation to act
towards a goal is based on existing individual need (Maslow, 1943). Two elements of Maslow’s
theory are applied in utilizing near miss data to change the work process and apply learned
principles: (a) Variations in the paths to reach the goal of active learning from near miss incident
events and (b) The motivation to take action or not after an event to advance active learning.
To the extent that individual needs can be classified, Maslow’s theory of motivation is
applied in understanding how the common goal of learning from near miss incidents is shared by
the organization and the worker, yet varies in interpretation. As previously illustrated in Figure
13, the context of active learning shows how purposeful actions or non-actions are directed
toward the goal of active learning. Active learning is driven by need. Needs are observed
through the actions or non-actions directed toward the active learning goal or purpose.
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The purpose of reporting a near miss incident is explained by workers in terms of benefit
to people. Actions or non-actions are recognized as bureaucratic and informal practices that
align with the beliefs of the worker and the organization. The goal to achieve active learning is
encumbered when the two sets of practices obstruct the goal.
Closing the active learning gap. An acknowledgement of the gap that impedes the path
to the goal of active learning from near miss incidents is essential because near miss data are
under-collected. Under-collection impacts the way data are utilized to apply change to the work
process and to incorporate learned principles in a cumulative way. Active learning is facilitated
by diminishing the obstructive elements. Active learning optimizes near miss data and
minimizes obstruction between paths in three ways: (a) by changing perceptions about the
severity of an event, (b) by extending the range of impact of the event itself, and (c) by
optimizing the communication that follows the event as soon as practical.
Perceptions of Incident Severity
HaSE do not always maintain a visible presence in the work environment. It is possible
that the tendency to evaluate severity potential at the time an incident occurs develops through
experience with incidents. The practice of evaluating severity with a goal to categorize based on
effect or outcome of the event suggests that pervasive beliefs exist about incident types. The
outcome of the event helps to shape beliefs in each path.
Beliefs drive the motivation to take action or not to advance learning from near miss data.
If incident data are categorized strictly as a function of the incident tracking process, then the
path to active learning remains limited by old data and by updates to new HaSE. The future of
active learning depends on how the value of near miss data are perceived and utilized.
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The Impact of the Near Miss and a Perceived Priority of Motives
The motivation to take action or not to advance active learning is observed through
actions or non-actions by the worker and the organization. Over a career, workers log multiple
near miss incident events. The organization is motivated by three needs at the time an incident
occurs: (a) the need to maintain a healthy workforce, (b) the need to comply with regulatory
agency mandates, and (c) the need to avoid non-compliance penalty fees. Although some
industry classifications are exempt from maintaining records of OSHA injury and illness because
of the size of the organization, all industries are mandated to report an incident that results in a
fatality, amputation, in-patient hospitalization, or loss of eye (U.S. Department of Labor, 2015c).
The incident worker is motivated to preserve personal safety and the safety of others at
the same time the organization is motivated by the desire to maintain a healthy workforce, to
comply with regulatory agency mandates, and to avoid penalties for non-compliance. The
prioritization of individual needs is subject to change (Maslow, 1943). Assuming a near miss
event stimulates the prominence of a compelling need, the four motivation components
(maintaining a healthy workforce, compliance with regulatory agency mandates, non-compliance
penalties, and preserving personal safety and the safety of others) compete for priority.
A prevailing need does not depend on the fulfillment of another need (Maslow, 1943). In
other words, depending on demand of the prevailing need, one need presides over another. As
such, the action or inaction of the organizational translates to the individual worker as a
perceived near miss incident priority of motives. The way the near miss incident priority of
motives is perceived suggests workers pay attention to what management pays attention to.
Workers apply past experiences to form perceptions about near miss incidents. The perceptions
frame decisions to take action or not.
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The near miss incident priority of motives and individual worker experiences with
incidents and with reporting incidents combine to frame the motivation to take action or not
toward reaching the active learning goal. Workers expressed that the goal of reporting an
incident (known as “the stated goal”) is to communicate that an incident has occurred and to
signal that change is needed to control the potential for recurrence through active learning and
balancing resources. It appears that the near miss incident priority of motives is the worker
reality of the value of near miss data and what the data mean to the organization. As such, the
actions the organizations take after an event is the reality of the prevailing need priority. It is the
experience with incidents and with incident reporting that changes worker perceptions and
motivates workers to take action or not.
The worker experience and the incident priority of motives prevail to guide the principle
of action. In other words, worker action or inaction after a near miss event is guided by (or the
worker is motivated to act or not) a prevailing need arising from experience with past near miss
incidents or beliefs about the incident priority of motives, or a combination of both. Individual
principles of action or inaction develop out of beliefs and perceptions and are adopted over time.
When management pays attention to prioritizing the results of the incident over the value of the
data itself, workers come to expect that the resulting severity of an event aligns with value of the
data and, as such, the level of attention that the incident commands.
It is possible that increased attention by management will result in a change in worker
perception. Both the worker and the organization are driven to act or not to seek change that
facilitates hazards mitigation. Active learning facilitates change when the unique circumstances
that surround a near miss are understood. Although communicated formally by the organization,
the reality is that the near miss priority of motives is validated by experience with incidents and
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through the actions associated with reporting an incident. The actions or inactions of the
organization after a near miss occurs communicate the priorities for the work process.
Optimizing Hazard Mitigation Through Communication
The value of near miss data to hazard mitigation is overlooked and leads to the undercollection of data. The lessons from incidents that result in the form of formal and informal
practices, training, procedures, and guidance documents are applied through formal, informal,
and local verbal communication. Organizations must understand that analyzing near miss data
facilitates active learning, and active learning drives hazard mitigation. Unfortunately, when the
result of a near miss is classified by severity, the action level does not provoke priority, and the
low priority is reflected in the communication that follows.
The formal procedures and guidance documents that organizations use to communicate
hazards originate from the evaluation of hazards by potential for severity. Near miss events are
often overlooked based on the degree of severity of the outcome. A potential of severity is
applied to classify the results of a low priority near miss event. The problem with classifying the
result of the event before analysis is that classification limits active learning by utilizing old
HaSE data that do not include consideration of emerging new hazards. A focus on the outcome
of the event itself means that new HaSE are not communicated. The broadest opportunities for
learning reside within the immediate work environments that are closest to the process.
Organizations communicate the value of near miss incident data through actions or
inaction. Even though organizations direct workers to report all incidents, workers gauge the
resulting organizational actions against a desire to preserve personal safety and the safety of
others. It is the measurement of concern about near miss incident events and the perceived value
of the data to the organization that workers interpret and transfer into action or inaction.
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Therefore, the goal of active learning is optimized when the worker perceives that the near miss
incident priority of motives resembles the desire to preserve personal safety and the safety of
others. The channels of worker communication are open when personal safety and the safety of
others are perceived to be important to management.
Not only do workers evaluate near miss communication based on perceived
organizational action or inaction, but workers use experience with events, past experiences with
reporting, and personal resolve to guide action or inaction to communicate the near miss data.
Ideally, the near miss incident priority of motives and the need to preserve personal safety and
the safety of others combine to frame worker action or inaction to communicate. The action
demonstrates the goal to learn from near miss data in a cumulative way.
When near miss data are communicated and shared in real time, updates to HaSE support
the cumulative component of active learning. It appears that the approach to communicating is
tied to a perceived value, since the perspectives that workers develop about near miss incidents
change with experience and with experiences in reporting. Workers evaluate a perceived benefit
from reporting and communicate the value through action or inaction when the outcome of the
near miss appears to be tangible or when past experiences with incidents frame personal resolve
to share.
The future of understanding recovery from near miss events in terms of perceptions of
severity, impact, and cumulative utility of near miss data lies in continued research. I propose
four key questions that direct the focus of future inquiry: (a) What are key indicators that
workers are engaged in active learning within workspaces? (b) In what ways do worker beliefs
impact communication of near miss data? (c) What are the types of near miss incidents that
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occur within confined spaces? (d) How are housekeeping practices regarded and managed
within workspaces?
Conclusion
When the work process is working as it should, it is easy to discount the value of near
miss data and ignore the intangibles. The utility of near miss data to cumulative learning is not
easily quantified. When the perceived benefit is tangible enough or is subjectively valuable to
motivate, action results. The action does not necessarily result in communication because some
hazards are mitigated on the spot. To overcome the subjective evaluation associated with the
prioritization of near miss data based on the outcome, organizations must recognize the
intangible value of near miss data. Therefore, organizations must communicate in a way that
encourages the prioritization of near miss data and demonstrates commitment to preserving
personal safety and the safety of others.
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Good Day,
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me for this interview. I am Julia McGee, a student at
the Benerd School of Education at the University of the Pacific, Sacramento campus, California.
I am conducting a study about worker perceptions of incident reporting in aircraft ground
operations and petrochemical industries. This interview is designed to discuss workplace
hazards and incident reporting. The duration is 60-90 minutes. I will request your permission to
audio-record the interview in order to capture the pertinent details of our conversation. I ask that
you not describe incidents in which injuries or damage to equipment or the environment have
occurred. The topic of incidents can be sensitive, and the interview questions will require
reflection on past experiences in your former workplace. You may withdraw from this interview
at any time. At all times, I will make every effort to protect your anonymity when the results of
the interview are shared. No personally identifiable information will be asked of you. Your
responses in the interview will be kept anonymous. The interview questions are designed to
understand your interpretations about hazards and incidents in your previous work environment.
The interview should last about 60-90 minutes. Again, thank you for taking the time to
participate in this video conference or telephone interview.

Do you have any questions about what I have explained so far?
Your responses will be assigned to pseudonym Number (Assign Numbers S1 -S8) ___
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To capture the pertinent details of our conversation, I would like your permission to audio-record
this interview.
Do I have your permission to audio-record this interview? I will start the recording.
Pseudonym

Interview Date / Time

Industry

Recording Start / Stop

Key Question One:
In what ways do workers in aircraft ground operations and petrochemical operations
describe hazards of the work environment?
Key Question Two:
How is a near miss incident defined amongst workers in aircraft ground operations
and petrochemical operations?
Key Question Three:
How is the goal of near miss reporting interpreted amongst workers?
Key Question Four:
In what ways are reporting the occurrence of an incident related to the OSHA goals
of identifying hazards and preventing the recurrence of an incident?

The first set of questions is about hazards that existed where you used to work.

1. So, tell me a little bit about the type of work that you have done.
2. When did you last work in that industry?
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3. How long have you worked in that industry?
4. Thinking about your time in the ___ industry, describe some of the hazards of that job.
5. In your observation, what were some of the more frequently occurring hazards?
6. What are some of the benefits to identifying a hazard?
7. How can you determine if a hazard had the potential to cause an injury?
Throughout the conversation, I remind you to not describe incidents that resulted in injury or
damage to equipment or the environment.
Sometimes, injuries, damage to equipment, or damage to the environment occur when hazards
are recognized or when hazards go undetected.
Sometimes, injuries and damage are averted when incidents do not advance or do not
materialize to become accidents.

8. What has been your experience with incident events?
If none, then thank you for sharing your experiences and participating in the interview. I will
now stop the recording. Otherwise, continue to the next question.

9. How would you define an incident that almost resulted in an accident?
Let’s refer to your definition as a Type-X event. I will reference your definition in subsequent
questions.
Throughout this conversation, I remind you to not describe incidents that resulted in injury or
damage to equipment or the environment.

10. Have you experienced a Type-X event? If so, describe your experience.
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11. In reflecting on your Type-X event, did you share your experience with anyone? Describe
the experience.
12. How did you know what actions to take when a Type-X event occurred?
13. Were you required to report a Type-X event? If so, what was the process to report?
14. What has been your experience in reporting a Type-X event?
15. What do you consider to be the purpose of reporting a Type-X event?
16. Thinking about your progression in the industry, from the earlier years to the more recent,
what has been your experience in reporting Type-X events?
I remind you to not describe incidents that resulted in injury or damage to equipment or the
environment.
17. Describe the types of incidents that you were required to report.
18. Based on incidents that you know of, describe incidents that you would classify as Type-X
events.
19. When thinking about preventing recurring hazards, what makes one method of hazard
removal more effective than another?
20. In what ways are reporting Type-X events useful?
21. How does reporting a Type-X event prevent the recurrence of a future incident?
22. How does reporting a Type-X event promote hazard identification?
23. Thinking about your span of experience on the job, from the earlier days to the more recent,
how has your interpretation of reporting Type-X events changed, if at all?
24. Earlier, you defined the purpose of reporting incident events. What other approaches or
methods are useful in achieving the same goal?
25. Now that you have been away from the industry, how has your perception of reporting TypeX events changed, if at all?
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Is there anything else about Type-X events that you haven’t had a chance to discuss?
Thank you for taking the time to share your experiences. I will now stop the recording. If you
have any further questions, you may contact me at 707 624 0780. Thank you for participating in
the study.

